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What does good policing look like? At first blush, that question
may conjure up images of uniformed officers chatting with local
residents, playing with laughing children while on patrol, or
attending community meetings. But now consider the question in
different contexts. What does good policing look like when an officer
has to respond to a minor fender bender? Or notify a parent of a
child's lethal drug overdose? Or interview a suspected serial rapist?
Or approach a person who is acting erratically? Or enforce an
outstanding arrest warrant against someone who angrily insists
that the officer is harassing him? As these scenarios suggest, there
is no single answer: good policing depends on the situation.
How, then, can we best ensure that officers engage in good
policing, given the wide variety of tasks they must perform?
Activists, politicians, and officers themselves have called for more
education-training in de-escalation techniques, cultural awareness,
and implicit biases'-and better equipment, including body-worn
cameras2 and less-lethal weaponry, such as Tasers,
3 as well as
change in agency policies and procedures
4 and reform for a host of
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1. See, e.g., Julia Edwards, Justice Dept. Mandates 'Implicit Bias'
Training for Agents, Lawyers, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2016, 9:27 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/implicit-bias-training-for-agents-us-
57727284e4bOdbblbbbbel5f.
2. Ariel Edwards-Levy, Police Body Cameras Receive Near-Universal
Support in Poll, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 16, 2015, 1:20 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/16/body-cameras-poll-n-7079184.html.
3. Paul Elias, San Francisco Police Chief Urges Stun Gun Use After
Shooting, AP: BIG STORY (Dec. 10, 2015, 9:41 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article
/fac2d29bd0e84502a6717824b76df32c/san-francisco-police-chief'urgesstun' gun
-use-after.
4. One of the ten policy solutions advocated by Campaign Zero, for
example, calls for substantial changes to agency use-of-force policies. Limit Use
of Force, CAMPAIGN ZERO, http://www.joincampaignzero.org/force (last visited
Aug. 29, 2016); see also Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64
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legal structures that regulate the police.5 But while those changes
can marginally improve policing practices and public perceptions of
the profession and may be necessary components of meaningful,
long-term reform, they will not be sufficient to accomplish lasting
change on their own.
In this Article, I contend that a more fundamental reform is
necessary: the core principles of policing need to be adjusted to
change how officers view their job and their relationship with the
community. Law enforcement has long taken great pride in its
adherence to a Warrior ethos, which emphasizes honor, duty,
resolve, and a willingness to engage in righteous violence. Warrior
rhetoric has infused modern policing, shaping how officers perceive
their role and informing the way they approach and interact with
the public. It has promoted a self-image of officers as soldiers on the
front lines in the never-ending battle to preserve order and
civilization against the forces of chaos and criminality, and it is
believed to both ensure effective law enforcement and increase
safety. In too many communities, however, the principles that have
grown out of Warrior policing have proven counterproductive,
contributing to a distrustful, adversarial, and sometimes aggressive
approach to policing that has undermined good police-community
relations and exposed officers and civilians alike to unnecessary
risk. Today, law enforcement is reaping what the Warrior culture
has sown. Policing in the United States is in crisis. Public
confidence in policing is at its lowest point since 1993, when four Los
Angeles Police Department ("LAPD") officers were prosecuted in
federal court, after a state court acquittal, for the beating of Rodney
King.6 Twenty-three years later, a bare majority of Americans
report confidence in the police,7 and an unprecedented number of
people report no or very little confidence in policing.8
Long-term reform requires rethinking the professional self-
image of policing and changing some of the core values that inform
officers' actions and decisions. I recognize the enormity of that
simple statement. This is no small task, but it is a critical
component, perhaps the critical component, of lasting reform.
BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (suggesting changes to Internal Affairs and
Civilian Oversight).
5. See, e.g., Roger L. Goldman, A Model Decertification Law, 32 ST. LouIs
PUB. L. REV. 147 (2012); Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that police agencies should be
required to apply administrative law principles such as notice-and-comment
procedure).
6. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years,
GALLUP (June 19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police
-lowest-years.aspx.
7. As of the June 2015 poll, fifty-two percent of Americans report "quite a




Acknowledging the need for cultural change is nothing new. Every
major commission that has studied policing has discussed, to some
degree, the need for the profession to create an environment that
minimizes misconduct.9 Sociologists have described the role of
agency culture in shaping officer actions and attitudes since the
1960s.10 More than a decade ago, Barbara Armacost observed that
"the police organization bears significant responsibility for police
misbehavior," particularly excessive force.
11  Subsequent legal
scholarship has both offered solutions and questioned the
effectiveness of legal interventions as a mechanism for lasting police
reform,12 but a robust discussion of the principles that inform
9. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF'T, No. 11 REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 3-6 (1931); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING 33 (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce
_finalreport.pdf; Corruption in Uniform; Excerpts of What the Commission
Found: Loyalty Over Integrity, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/07/nyregion/corruption-uniform-excerpts-what
.commission.found-loyalty-over-integrity.html?pagewanted=al (discussing the
Knapp and Mollen Commissions); James G. Kolts, The Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE (July 1992),
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0001-OO
2 3 .pdf; Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, EISENHOWER FOUND.,
http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf (last visited June 27,
2016) (discussing the Kerner Commission); The Christopher Commission
Report, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police
/uspo73.htm (last visited June 27, 2016). Other reports have come to the same
conclusion. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE:
POLICE BRUTALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1998) (detailing
reports of incidents in various cities to demonstrate barriers to police
accountability).
10. See WILLIAM K. MUIR, POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS 190 (1977);
ELIZABETH REUSS-TANN, TWO CULTURES OF POLICING: STREET COPS &
MANAGEMENT COPS 86 (1983); WILLIAM WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORALITY 16, 49 (1970); JAMES Q.
WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 233 (1968).
11. Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 456, 522-45 (2004).
12. See generally Rachel Harmon, Limited Lcverage: Federal Remedies and
Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33 (2012) (advocating new federal
policies that reward good police conduct, rather than further attempts to punish
bad conduct); Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Police
Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009) (exploring alternative ways 42 U.S.C. § 14141
could be used to induce police reform); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and
the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997) (arguing for enhanced community-police
reciprocity and political controls on the police to manage police discretion);
Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 817 (1999) (examining consent decrees in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Steubenville, Ohio and issues arising from those
decrees); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3189 (2014) (contending that the Department of Justice "must adopt a
more transparent" process for enforcing § 14141).
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policing has largely fallen by the wayside. This Article revives that
discussion by arguing that police reform requires changing officers'
attitudes about policing itself.
For real change to occur the principles and values that underlie
policing must not only instruct officers to act lawfully but also
encourage them to build public trust and increase police
legitimacy-to engage in what Tracey Meares and Peter Neyroud
call "rightful policing."13 To encourage rightful policing, the value
system that guides officer decision making must encourage
individual officers to continually reconcile the short-term goals of
policing, such as order maintenance and crime response, with the
long-term goals, particularly improving police-community relations.
To that end, law enforcement culture should seek to instill in
officers the priorities of the Guardian: protecting civilians from
unnecessary indignity and harm.14
Before continuing, a clarification and a caveat are in order. An
officer's attitudes and actions are the result of both environmental
and individual factors, and a thorough examination of that
relationship is outside the scope of this Article. My focus is limited
to the principles that inform officers' attitudes and actions without
examining exactly how those principles are instilled by agency
culture or climate,15 enshrined or obfuscated in policy,16 or
13. Tracey L. Meares & Peter Neyroud, Rightful Policing, 2015 NEW PERSP.
POLICING 6-7, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/74084/1679313/
version/4/file/RightfulPolicing.pdf.
14. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra
note 9, at 33; Sue Rahr & Stephen K. Rice, From Warriors to Guardians:
Recommitting American Police Culture to Democratic Ideals, 2015 NEW PERSP.
POLICING 4, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/248654.pdf. As this Article will
explain, the distinction between Guardian and Warrior policing is not merely
semantic. However, it is worth noting at the outset that I do not believe the
exact terminology is particularly important. I would be delighted to see the
practical results of principled policing, which is my focus here, if the phrase
"Guardian policing" were discarded in favor of "Wombat policing" or left alone
entirely so that "Warrior policing" remained the prevailing description. I will
admit a strong preference for the phrase "Guardian policing" because it best
captures the concepts I seek to communicate and lends itself less to
misappropriation than does the term "Warrior."
15. Sociologists studying the effect of organizational dynamics on human
behavior distinguish between climate and culture. Both are grounded in an
agency's value system, but climate is "a product of the formal organisational
systems." Geoffrey R. Alpert et al., Measuring the Impact of Organisational
Culture and Climate on Police Officers'Decisions and Behaviour 2-3 (July 2012)
(working paper), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcs-plcng
/cn31763-eng.pdf. Culture, in contrast, results from 'less formal processes of
socialisation between organisational members." Id. There are conceptual and,
at least arguably, methodological differences in how an observer can
understand and study the climate and culture of a particular agency. Id.
16. Written policies and procedures are not necessarily a reliable
benchmark of agency priorities. Cf. Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental
614 [Vol. 51
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reinforced or undermined by training. The caveat, then, is this:
Although I attempt to distill a coherent set of principles from
modern policing, policing is not one dimensional. I make no claim
that the whole of modern policing reflects a universal approach to
law enforcement or that the principles I identify, both those that I
contend are problematic and those I believe are curative, are either
overwhelmingly present or entirely lacking at any given agency or
within any given officer. 17  Despite these very real variations
between agencies and officers, however, there is a coherent and
identifiable set of principles that pervade modern policing; it is those
principles that concern me here.
Part I describes the evolution of policing, tracing the
profession's guiding principles and distinguishing characteristics
from the world's first modern public police agency-the
Metropolitan Police Force in London. It reviews the Political Era's
early adoption of policing as a tool of local political machines, the
Professional Era's attempts to stamp out political cronyism and
corruption, and the Community Policing Era's effort to correct the
problems of a police force disconnected from the communities it
served. Understanding the dramatic, if often slow, changes to the
culture of domestic law enforcement sets up the argument that
police culture not only can change, it will change-the real inquiry
is what impact previous changes have wrought in the modern era
and how policing can change for the better in the future.
Part II introduces the Warrior principles that have permeated
modern policing and discusses the effect those principles have had
on the profession. It first describes the positive attributes of the
Warrior that policing so highly values: honor, duty, resolve, and a
willingness to engage in righteous violence. It then explores the
psychological and practical appeal of the Warrior concept, and
documents how the Warrior imagery and rhetoric have become
ubiquitous in law enforcement. It also demonstrates how, despite
the best of intentions, the Warrior concept is susceptible to
misappropriation, describing how it has been used to justify
attitudes and acts that fall far short of the principles for which it is
supposed to stand. Part II concludes by illustrating how Warrior
policing has become a problem for modern law enforcement, putting
Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2213 (2014) (discussing the
problems associated with overly detailed and bureaucratic department policies).
17. Further, while individual officers are assimilated into the profession,
their agencies, and their particular assignments, they retain a range of personal
values, beliefs, and assumptions that affect their behavior. Eugene A. Paoline
et al., Police Culture, Individualism, and Community Policing: Evidence from
Two Police Departments, 17 JUST. Q. 575, 576 (2000); Eugene A. Paoline,
Shedding Light on Police Culture: An Examination of Officers' Occupational
Attitudes, 7 POLICE Q. 205, 205 (2004); Eugene A. Paoline, Taking Stock:
Toward a Richer Understanding of Police Culture, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 199, 206
(2003).
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officers and civilians alike at greater risk, undermining positive
police-community relations, obstructing efforts to prevent and
investigate crime, and frustrating reform.
Part III offers an alternative set of guiding principles in the
form of Guardian policing. Guardian policing has enjoyed a surge in
popularity among some police leaders, and Guardian rhetoric has
appeared in the report issued by President Obama's Task Force on
21st Century Policing,18 popular media stories,19 and articles
intended for a law enforcement audience.20  But prior work,
including my own, has tended to treat Guardian policing as an
abstract concept incapable of precise definition. This Part offers a
more robust definition of the principles that underlie Guardian
policing and outlines how future work can address the necessary
components of changing police culture.
In advancing the argument for a Guardian culture in law
enforcement, I am not suggesting that officers should abandon the
skills of a Warrior. Although the policing profession has become
increasingly safe over the last thirty years, very real threats
remain.21 While I wish it were not the case, I do not foresee a future
18. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 9, at
11.
19. Kimberly Kindy, Creating Guardians, Calming Warriors, WASH. POST
(Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/10
/new-style-of-police-training-aims-to-produce-guardians-not-warriors; Kate
Mather, LAPD Urges Officers to Be Community Guardians, Not Warriors on
Crime, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local
/crimefla-me-warrior-guardians-20150821-story.html; Nick Morgan, Sheriff
Corey Falls Wants Officers to Shift from Warrior to Guardian, MAIL TRIB. (Mar.
4, 2016, 5:33 AM), http://www.mailtribune.com/article/20160304/NEWS
/160309853; Timothy Roufa, Guardians or Warriors? The Changing Role of Law
Enforcement, ABOUT CAREERS, http://criminologycareers.about.com/od/Career
_Trends/fllGuardians-or-Warriors-The-Changing-Role-of-Law-Enforcement.htm
(last visited June 27, 2016); Craig Schwartz, Close to Home: Warrior or
Guardian? A Good Officer Is Both, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Aug. 29, 2015),
http://www.pressdemocrat.com/opinion/4402654-181/close-to-home-why-officers
?artslide=0.
20. Not all articles view the change positively, of course. Jim Glennon,
Guardian Heart and Warrior Spirit, CALIBRE PRESS (July 8, 2015),
http://calibrepress.com/2015/07/guardian-heart-and-warrior-spirit/; H.K. Slade,
Are We Warriors? Is There a Place for Warriors in Law Enforcement Today?,
CALIBRE PRESS (June 12, 2015), http://calibrepress.com/2015/06/are-we
-warriors/; Dave Smith, Warriors or Guardians, POLICEMAG.COM (Jan. 13,
2016), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2016/01/warriors-or-
guardians.aspx; Val Van Brocklin, Warriors vs. Guardians: A Seismic Shift in
Policing or Just Semantics?, POLICEONE.COM (July 1, 2015),
http://www.policeone.comlleadership/articles/8633970-Warriors-vs-Guardians
-A-seismic-shift-in-policing-or-just-semantics/.
21. According to data collected by the FBI, an average of almost 115 officers
were feloniously killed every year from 1971 to 1980. Law Enforcement Officers
Killed, SOURCEBOOK CRIM. JUST. STAT. ONLINE tbl.3.154.2012,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf~t31542012.pdf. That ten-year average
[Vol. 51
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where officers will not face active threats. The nature of policing
requires officers to run toward peril, to interact with dangerous
individuals, and to use force both to advance the state's interest in
criminal justice and to protect themselves and others from physical
violence. Some commentators have observed that officers must have
the capacity to act as both Guardians and Warriors.22 I strongly
agree. My focus in this Article is not on whether an officer should be
more Warrior-like or more Guardian-like in any particular
encounter-that determination requires reviewing the nature and
circumstances of each unique situation. Instead of focusing on an
individual officer's specific decisions, this Article examines the
professional principles that affect officers' decision-making,
advancing the idea that the right guiding principles can instill in
officers a value system that enables them to make decisions that
encourage public engagement, foster trust, and build lasting
community partnerships.
I. THE CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF POLICING
The uniformed police officer. The marked police cruiser. The
hierarchical organization of paramilitary police agencies. Police
executives who are either directly elected, as is common with county
sheriffs,23 or appointed by a mayor, city council, or city manager.
24
Each of these facets of policing is largely taken for granted today, as
has decreased ever since, with an average of 49.6 officers feloniously killed
every year from 2006 to 2015. Id. Additionally, assaults have also decreased,
from a high of 65,907 officers assaulted on average every year from 1984 to
1994 (with an average of 35.8% of those officers being physically injured by the
assault) to an average of 56,208 officers assaulted every year (a 14.72%
decrease) from 2005 to 2014 (with an average of 27% of officers being physically
injured by the assault). Assaults on Law Enforcement Officers and Percent
Sustaining Personal Injury, SOURCEBOOK CRIM. JUST. STAT. ONLINE
tbl.3.165.2011, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t31652011.pdf. Assaults
with weapons have also decreased, from a high of 3317 assaults with firearms
on average every year from 1985 to 1994 and 1610 assaults with edged weapons
on average every year from 1983 to 1992, to an annual average of 2162 assaults
with firearms (a 34.82% decrease) and 964 assaults with edged weapons (a
40.12% decrease) every year from 2005 to 2014. Id. The decrease in the total
average number of armed assaults, unarmed assaults, and felonious killings
exists despite the increase in the U.S. population, the increase in the number of
officers in the country, and the increase in the number of officer-civilian
interactions every year.
22. Glennon, supra note 20; Dan Marcou, Why Obama's Advice to Police to
"Abandon Warrior Mindset" Won't Work, POLICEONE.COM (May 22, 2015),
https://www.policeone.com/1033-program/articles/8554059-Why-Obamas-advice
-to-police-to-abandon-warrior-mindset-wont-work.
23. Roger Scott, "Roots" A Historical Perspective of the Office of Sheriff,
SHERIFFS.ORG, http://www.sheriffs.org/publications-resources/resources/office-of
-sheriff (last visited June 27, 2016).
24. See Meet the Chief, TULSA POLICE, https://www.tulsapolice.org/content
/meet-the-chief.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2016).
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is the whole that they combine to create, but "[t]he concept of a
publicly funded entity designed to serve and protect society is a
relatively recent historical development."25  Historically, law
enforcement looked very different.26 Despite its relative modernity,
however, the guiding principles for law enforcement in the United
States have undergone seismic shifts. In this Part, I describe those
shifts at a relatively broad level of generality so as to set the stage
for the discussion of the Warrior principles that dominate modern
policing and the impact that these principles have had on officer
behaviors, police-community relations, and public safety.
A. Peelian Policing
Policing appeared in an early version of its modern form in
1829, when British Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel successfully
lobbied for the legislative act that created London's Metropolitan
Police Force.27 Constables with the Metropolitan Police Force were
given a book of "General Instructions," including nine directives for
officers. These directives are known today as the Peelian
Principles,2 8 and they are set forth below in their entirety:
1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their
repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil
their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of
25. JAMES F. PASTOR, THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICE IN AMERICA 33 (2003).
26. KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN
AMERICA 27 (2007) ("[Mlost of the institutions historically responsible for law
enforcement would not be recognizable to us as police."). Policing in the United
States was born of a combination of English institutions such as shire-reeves,
constables, night watches, and thief-takers, as well as domestic institutions like
rural slave patrols and city guards organized to prevent slave rebellions. See
WILLIAM J. BoPP & DONALD 0. SCHULTZ, A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 18 (1972); DAVID JOHNSON, AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT: A
HISTORY 3 (1981); PASTOR, supra note 25, at 33-35; JAMES F. RICHARDSON,
URBAN POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1974); ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE GREAT
DRUG WAR 163 (2005); ROBERT C. WADMAN & WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON, To
PROTECT AND TO SERVE: A HISTORY OF POLICE IN AMERICA 11 (2003); WILLIAMS,
supra, at 31-42.
27. Norman Gash, Sir Robert Peel, 2nd Baronet, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/biography/Sir-Robert-Peel-2nd-Baronet
(last visited Aug. 8, 2016).
28. Despite the name, there is a lack of evidence to support that Sir Robert
Peel developed the principles that bear his name. Historians believe that the
principles were actually set out by Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne, the first
(and joint) Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police Force. Home Office,





their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to
secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect
and approval of the public means also the securing of the
willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing
observance of laws.
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-
operation of the public can be secured diminishes
proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and
compulsion for achieving police objectives.
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to
public opinion; but by constantly demonstrating absolutely
impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy,
and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance
of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and
friendship to all members of the public without regard to their
wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and
friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual
sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion,
advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public
co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law
or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of
physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for
achieving a police objective.
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that
gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the
public and that the public are the police, the police being only
members of the public who are paid to give full time attention
to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests
of community welfare and existence.
8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-
executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp
the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the
State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the
guilty.
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the
absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of
police action in dealing with them.
29
This strategy of preventing crime, rather than dealing with its
effects ex post, and the tactical emphasis on building positive
29. Id.
2016]
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relationships with the community, which we take for granted with
regard to modern law enforcement, were groundbreaking changes at
the time.30 Policing by consent was, in the words of one police
historian, "unique in history and throughout the world because it
derived not from fear but almost exclusively from public co-
operation with the police, induced by them designedly by behaviour
which secure[d] and maintain[ed] for them the approval, respect and
affection of the public."31
B. The Political Era
The United States followed England's lead in th& 1830s32 with
municipal police agencies springing up as a response to rioting and
civil unrest.33  The immediate precursors of these early police
agencies-night watchmen and constabulary systems-had proven
deeply unpopular,34 and it did not take long for municipal police
agencies to supplant them. By the 1850s, police agencies were a
common fixture of large cities.35 Police officers, however, were not
readily identifiable; officers did not wear uniforms because of
mutual distrust between the public and officers themselves.36
Critics condemned uniforms as undemocratic imitations of royal
livery. 37 Officers themselves argued "the job was dangerous enough
without advertising that one was an officer."38 As a result, it took
30. CHARLES REITH, A NEW STUDY OF POLICE HISTORY 140 (1956).
31. Id.
32. Exactly which city first created a municipal police department remains
contested. Many police agencies date their origins on the development of a
daytime watch service. For example, Philadelphia is often cited as the first
police agency in the United States because it created a paid, daytime watch in
1833, despite abandoning the effort three years later. CHARLES R. SWANSON ET
AL., CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 3 (7th ed. 2000). Similarly, the Boston Police
Department is typically dated to 1838, when the city organized its day watch,
even though it had first paid night watchmen more than a century before. A
Brief History of the Boston, MA Police Department, BOSTONPOLICEMUSEUM.COM,
http:/fbostonpolicemuseum.com/history.html (last visited July 14, 2016). New
York City, for its part, began paying watchmen in 1658, shortly before the
British took it, under the name of Nieuw Amsterdam, from the Dutch. BoPP &
SCHULTZ, supra note 26, at 18-19.
33. RICHARDSON, supra note 26, at 21-22.
34. The Philadelphia Police Department was originally funded not by the
city or state government, but by a wealthy philanthropist who wanted
"Philadelphia to provide more effectually than they do now for the security and
property of the persons.., by a competent police." BOPP & SCHULTZ, supra note
26, at 35.
35. GEORGE F. COLE ETAL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 112 (2013).
36. WILBUR R. MILLER, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1509 (2012).
37. Id.
38. BoPP & SCHULTZ, supra note 26, at 39-40; see also JOHNSON, supra note
26, at 25 (describing the public sentiment that "[u]niforms were un-American in
principle"). This was, in all likelihood, a long-standing fear with historical
precedent. Watchmen in Charleston, South Carolina, for example, were so
620 [Vol. 51
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municipal police agencies decades to adopt uniforms. Boston did so
in 1858, New York in 1860, and Chicago in 1861.
39 Officers also
began carrying firearms at about this time, despite the prohibitions
against guns most police agencies had in place.
40 While police
executives and the public were skeptical about the need for officers
to have firearms, they eventually allowed the practice because doing
so "only recognized what was becoming standard" behavior among
officers.
41
Over the next half century, the sharp differences in American
and English policing became apparent. In England, the Crown was
a "powerful, central authority ... [that] establish[ed] a legitimate,
unifying mandate" for the police.42 But in the United States policing
was, and has since remained, a hyperlocalized endeavor, with each
city having its own police agency.43 Unlike today, however, policing
was intensely political. Both rank-and-file officers and police
executives were deeply beholden to local politics, often owing their
position to political patronage (which they often purchased) and, in
return, using their position to support their patron.
44 "[P]olitical
machines recruited and maintained police in office and on the beat,
while police helped ward leaders maintain their political offices by
encouraging citizens to vote for certain candidates, discouraging
them from voting for others, and, at times, by assisting in rigging
elections."45  Further, "[p]olice commanders consulted often with
local political representatives about police priorities and progress."
46
This tight relationship with the political system-so tight that
several scholars have called early police agencies "adjuncts to local
political machines"4 7-was not an unqualified evil. Good policing
meant supporting the local political establishment, and that meant
maintaining high levels of community satisfaction. Police officers
and executives alike took a broad view of their mandate, engaging
not just in preventative policing, primarily through foot patrols and
loathed in the 1700s that sailors "began to purposefully target the watchmen on
their rounds, sometimes beating them severely." WADMAN & ALLISON, supra
note 26, at 11-12.
39. JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 29.
40. Id. at 30.
41. Id.
42. George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing,
4 PERSP. ON POLICING 3 (1988), http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites
/default/files/114213.pdf.
43. See 1 21ST CENTURY CRIMINOLOGY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 823 (J.
Mitchell Miller ed., 2009).
44. Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 13-14 (1977) and
Kevin Ernest Jordan, Ideology and the Coming of Professionalism: American
Urban Police in the 1920's and 1930's (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Rutgers University)).
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the eventual introduction of automobiles, but also in social support
services.48 Early police agencies established and operated soup
kitchens and shelters for the homeless and for recent immigrants,
helped immigrants find work, and provided shoes and medicines to
the community.
49
Officers were part of the communities they served, typically
living in the neighborhoods they patrolled. The close connections
between officers and the communities they lived in and served
paved the way for the underpolicing of certain people, particularly
community insiders, and certain crimes, such as behaviors that were
illegal but consistent with local norms.5 0 Police officers did not see
their job as limited to defending the law-abiding members of the
community from the criminal element; they also punished violations
of the dominant social norms, leading to conflicts with community
outsiders, especially minority ethnic and racial groups.51  This
punishment could be as brutal as it was informal.5 2 "Often ruling
their beats with the 'ends of their nightsticks,' police regularly
targeted outsiders and strangers for rousting and 'curbstone
justice."'53
Outside of political pressures, there was little, if anything, in
the way of police regulation.54 The criminal justice process was, in
many cases, equally vicious. Police investigations at the time often
involved giving suspects what became known as the "third degree"-
the use of pain to compel incriminating confessions.55  The
Wickersham Commission, which investigated the failures of law
enforcement during Prohibition, reported that while "the use of
physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary
confessions or admissions" was "widespread," it formally remained
48. Id.
49. DONNA M. WELLS, BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT 8 (2003); Kelling &
Moore, supra note 42, at 3.




54. GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM, UNDERSTANDING POLICE USE
OF FORCE: OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, AND RECIPROCITY 4-6 (2004) (discussing "the era
of nonregulation").
55. The origins of the phrase "the third degre" are unclear. It has been
suggested that the phrase refers to the arduous tests that Freemasons must
undergo to obtain the 'Third Degree" of Freemasonry, or that interrogation is
literally the third phase of the criminal justice process, following the arrest (the
first phase) and transportation to the police agency (the second phase). JEROME
A. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE
OF FORCE 43 (1993). The phrase may have originated with Thomas F. Byrnes, a
notoriously brutal New York Police Department officer and detective in the
1870s and '80s, who may have coined the phrase "the third degree" as a pun on
his last name. KEN ALDER, THE LIE DETECTORS: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN




"a secret and illegal practice."56 Corruption was similarly pervasive,
both in the form of bribes being solicited by or offered to officers and
in the form of political cronyism and the manipulation 
of elections.57
Both pecuniary and political corruption was all but inevitable in a
system that revolved around patronage and "heavily decentralized"
police organizational structures, which effectively prevented police
commanders from meaningfully supervising officers.
58
C. The Professional Era
The Political Era of policing lasted for almost a century, from
the establishment of the first police agencies until it began to give
way to the Professional Era in the 1930s. The evolution of policing
in this new era was marked by a concerted effort to distance police
from the political machines of the day. Civil service systems were
put into place to govern the selection and promotion of officers, and
the power of politicians to hire and fire police commanders was
eliminated59 or sharply curtailed.
60  Policing's first principles
shifted: political and public approval were no longer the measure of
successful policing.6 1 Good policing was instead defined by officers'
rigor and expertise in enforcing criminal law.
62 Formal rules and
informal norms were developed to prevent officers from pandering to
community sensibilities, including a prohibition, in some cities, on
officers living in the neighborhoods that they patrolled.
63 Peace
officers became law enforcers. Perhaps more importantly, policing
became a self-regulated profession.
64
As policing's principles shifted, so too did officers' actions and
attitudes. Officers became less involved in order maintenance and
focused their efforts on crime control.
65 Agencies no longer operated
homeless shelters or soup kitchens.
66  Using crime-fighting
specialists to deal with generic social ills was considered a foolish
waste of resources.67  Actions that did not directly prevent or
respond to criminal incidents-derisively referred to as "social
work"-were considered far outside the purview 
of the police.68
56. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF'T, supra note 9, at 3-4.
57. Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 4.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 5. In Los Angeles and Cincinnati, for example, police chiefs were
selected through the civil service system. Id.
60. Id. In Milwaukee, the police chief was appointed for a lifetime term




64. ALPERT & DUNHAM, supra note 54, at 6-9.
65. Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 8.
66. Id. at 5-6.
67. See id. at 6.
68. Id. at 5-6.
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Professional policing was exemplified by detached, highly skilled
experts who could dedicate themselves to crime fighting without
being distracted by the social or emotional aspects of a specific
victim or community. One of the era's most popular television
shows, Dragnet, featured Detective Sergeant Joe Friday, a stone-
faced LAPD detective whose tireless search for the "facts" typified
the Professional Era image of the cool, effective, and no-nonsense
crime fighter.69
With a new police culture came new metrics for success.
Qualitative factors like political approval and community
satisfaction gave way to more quantitative evaluations.
[I]ndividual officers' effectiveness in dealing with crime was
judged by the number of arrests they made; other measures of
police [agency] effectiveness included response time (the time
it takes for a police car to arrive at the location of a call for
service) and "number of passings" (the number of times a
police car passes a given point on a city street). Regardless of
all other indicators, however, the primary measure of police
effectiveness was the crime rate as measured by the Uniform
Crime Reports.7 0
In response to these new measures, police agencies became
centrally organized. The foot patrols, substations, and local
precincts that had been so accessible to the community were reduced
or eliminated, replaced with vehicle-based, "preventative patrol"
tactics and a central dispatch system that channeled calls for service
to the appropriate "units" for rapid response to an incident.71
69. Id. at 6. Contrary to popular belief, Joe Friday never actually used thephrase commonly attributed to him: "Just the facts." The origin of that
misattributed phrase appears to be audio satire that parodied Dragnet by
presenting the story of St. George's fight with a dragon in the style of Dragnet,
in which Joe Friday qua St. George states, "We just want to get the facts, sir."
See VinylOldiesJukebox, Stan Freberg - St. George & The Dragonet, 1953
Capitol Record, YOUTUBE (Feb. 19, 2012), https://www.youtube.comjwatch
?v=oUdFLyNCeI4.
70. Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 7.
71. Id. at 5-6. Preventative patrol refers to officers driving through their
assigned neighborhoods on a random schedule to promote the image of a
pervasive police presence, which was-and is-believed to deter crime. ALEX R.
PIQUERO, THE HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 60 (2015). Rapid response
refers to reducing the time between when an emergency call comes in and the
time an officer arrives on scene, which was similarly believed to reduce crime.
Id. Empirical support has not always been easy to come by, but existing studies
do not provide consistent support for either proposition. See GEORGE L. KELLING
ET AL., THE KANSAS CITY PREVENTATIVE PATROL EXPERIMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT
16 (1974); LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS,
WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING ch. 8, at 40 (1997),
www.rolim.com.br/2002/_pdfs/ing.pdf; WILLIAM SPELMAN & DALE K. BROWN,
CALLING THE POLICE: CITIZEN REPORTING OF SERIOUS CRIME 22-24 (1984).
Nevertheless, modern resources instruct police commanders to treat both
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Indeed, "[t]he patrol car became the symbol of policing during the
[1930s] and [1940s] .... It represented mobility, power,
conspicuous presence, control of officers, and professional distance
from citizens."
72
The shift from politically responsive policing to professional
policing reduced corruption, particularly political corruption, but it
also detached policing from both politics and the community. Law
enforcement agencies were no longer part of the local political
structure; those ties were intentionally severed and policing recast
as part of the criminal justice system.
73 Agency priorities and
officers' decisions were based not on political approval or community
support, but on the knowledge, skills, and training believed to be
exclusively available to members of the policing profession.
74 Police
were specialists, professionals who should be left alone to do what
they and they alone knew how to do. Inevitably, this mindset
affected the way that police officers interacted with and related to
the public. Citizens could help by reporting crime and then stepping
out of the way. "The proper role of citizens in crime control was to
be relatively passive recipients of professional crime control
services .... Citizens met their responsibilities when a crime
occurred by calling police, deferring to police actions, and being good
witnesses if called upon to give evidence."
75 It was the job of the
police officer to do the rest.
76
The Professional Era of policing remained strong until the
1960s. During this time, crime increased despite the best efforts of
the police to combat it, undermining the perception of police as
uniquely knowledgeable specialists who were most effective when
left alone.77 The image of police as neutral professionals was further
called into question as officers came into conflict-often violent
conflict-with minorities migrating to urban areas and anti-war
protesters on the streets.
78 Had these conflicts happened out of
sight, they may not have undermined police legitimacy among the
general public. But the growth of television meant graphic images
of police violence were now brought into the public's 
living rooms.79
response time and visibility as important considerations when allocating patrol
officers. ERIC J. FRITSCH ET AL., POLICE PATROL ALLOCATION AND DEPLOYMENT
49-50 (2009).
72. Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 8 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 5.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 9.
78. LEONARD A. STEVERSON, POLICING IN AMERICA: A REFERENCE 
HANDBOOK
114 (2008).
79. Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 8 ("The legitimacy of police was
questioned: students resisted police, minorities rioted against them, and the
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Viewers were not reassured by what they saw. The image of police
as crime-fighting specialists who were best left alone to practice
their craft was indelibly marred. The professional police culture,
which had worked so well to fix the problems created during the
Political Era, proved "unable to adjust to the changing social
circumstances of the [1960s] and [1970s]."80
D. The Community Policing Era
The public's mounting distrust, along with experience and
substantive research that called into question many of the
assumptions about the relationship between police and crime, gave
rise to the next evolution in law enforcement: the Community
Policing Era. The policing profession found that it could not
successfully control crime without addressing the underlying
problems that caused crime.81 Those problems, however, did not
always lend themselves to crime-fighting interventions. The
relationships between officers and members of the public were vital;
the information relayed through those relationships allowed police
to prevent and investigate crime and apprehend criminals.8 2 But as
the social unrest and political upheaval of the 1960s demonstrated,
police agencies did not always have good relationships with their
constituents.83 Changes to the police role and police regulation were
necessary.84  External regulation was increasingly viewed as
essential,85 and the police were called upon to become more than
crime fighters. In 1955, the LAPD turned to its officers for
suggestions about a new motto for the police academy, writing in a
solicitation in an internal magazine that "[t]he motto should be one
that in a few words would express some or all the ideals to which the
Los Angeles police service is dedicated."86 The winning entry,
submitted by Officer Joseph S. Dorobek, was, "To Protect and to
Serve."8 7 That phrase became the new mantra for law
public, observing police via live television for the first time, questioned their
tactics.").
80. Id. at 9.
81. See George L. Kelling, Police and Communities: The Quiet Revolution, 1
PERSP. ON POLICING 2 (1988).
82. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 5 (1994).
83. See ST-.VERSON, supra note 78, at 114.
84. See generally Jack R. Greene & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Police Overview, in 2
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 531, at 534 (Ronald Gottesman &Richard Maxwell Brown eds., 1999) (contending that the history of policing has
been marked by the struggle to resolve both the role that police play and how
society should regulate the profession).
85. ALPERT & DUNHAM, supra note 54, at 9-12.
86. The Origin of the LAPD Motto, L.A. POLICE DEP'T,
http://www.lapdonline.org/history-of the-lapdlcontentbasic view/1128 (last




enforcement.88 The police mission was recast yet again, with the
exclusive focus on crime fighting supplanted by a more holistic and
service-oriented approach.8 9
Under this expanded police mission, officers were charged not
only with reducing crime, but also with improving community
members' quality of life by alleviating fear and despair. Social
disorder, which had been ignored during the Professional Era, was
now to be addressed as a cause of both crime and fear.
90 But officers
could not tackle this issue by relying solely on the authority
provided by criminal law; disorder is, and was, often entirely legal.
Officers needed a new source of legitimacy. "[P]olice learned that
they had to seek authorization from local citizens to intervene in
disorderly situations."91 Officers had to work cooperatively with
civilians to identify problems, to craft solutions, and to evaluate
those solutions.92 Community problems were to be addressed and
evaluated in a comprehensive way, with criminal law being only one
of several available tools in any given situation.
93
In theory, community policing was a return to the Peelian
Principles. In practice, however, it rarely worked out that way.
Community policing has failed to live up to its promise because of
definitional failures, implementation and evaluation failures, and,
most importantly, cultural resistance within law enforcement.
Efforts to implement community policing principles have suffered,
first and foremost, from a widespread failure to understand exactly
what community policing entails. The phrase is more accurately
used to refer to a loosely defined policing philosophy or set of
philosophies that should permeate decision making by informing
police commanders and officers about the practice of policing.
94
Unfortunately, it is often used to describe a particular program,
strategy, or tactic; certain police actions are designated as
"community policing" while others are not. Officers and agencies
alike have struggled to define community policing at a useful level of
specificity, leaving the "community policing" designation arbitrary
and inconsistent. Officers are left unsure of whom exactly they
should be serving, which problems to focus on, and how to solve
them. The lack of guidance about how to prioritize different
community groups' various problems has proved particularly vexing
88. KAREN M. HESS & CHRISTINE HESS ORTHMANN, INTRODUCTION TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 129 (2012).
89. HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 11 (1990).
90. Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 8.
91. Id. at 10.
92. WILLIAM SPELMAN & JOHN ECK, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 2 (1987)
(describing the Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment ("SARA") Model
of problem solving).
93. Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 11.
94. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, COMMUNITY POLICING DEFINED 1-5 (2012).
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given the disparity in different groups' political capital; solving the
problems of the downtown business community, for example, may
mean exacerbating the problems of the homeless population, and
vice versa.95 The absence of a functional definition of community
policing has left officers without direction about whether or how to
balance those interests.
Given the definitional problems, failures of implementation are
inevitable. It is often unclear who should be responsible for
community policing or whether community policing should be
limited to trained specialists or implemented by officers more
generally.96  While the extensive training community-policing
officers receive is laudable, the creation of special squads fosters the
perception of community policing as something separate and apart
from other aspects of policing, "making it unlikely that community
policing will ever grow beyond the bounds of the special unit."97
Further, the goals and methods of a specialized community-policing
unit do not always align with the rest of the police agency. But
adopting a more generalist approach is often no more successful.
Properly instilling in every officer the principles of community
policing takes time and resources that many agencies prefer to
allocate to training in the "high-liability" areas: vehicle operations,
the use of lethal and less-lethal force, and first aid.98 Without
exposure to the underlying principles of community policing, officers
are more likely to view community policing as extra work above and
beyond their current duties, rather than a philosophy that should be
incorporated into the way they perform every aspect of their jobs.99
In the absence of clear direction about what community policing
is and who should be doing it, officers tend to direct their efforts
where they are most welcome-for example, middle- or higher-
income communities with well-organized watch groups or
neighborhood associations and relatively low crime-instead of
where they expect to be met by suspicion or outright resistance-
typically low-income, high-crime neighborhoods with a large
95. See, e.g., Stoughton, supra note 16, at 2199-200.
96. San Francisco, an early adopter of community policing, took the
specialist approach in 1962, creating a unit to "help to reduce crime by reducing
despair-by acting as a social service agency to ameliorate some of the
difficulties encountered by minority group persons." Jerome H. Skolnick, The
Police and the Urban Ghetto, in THE AMBIVALENT FORCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
POLICE 217, 222 (Arthur Niederhoffer & Abraham S. Blumberg eds., 2d ed.
1976). The unit struggled "to maintain its identity as a police organization and
at the same time to win the confidence of the minority ... population [that was]
ordinarily considered a police problem." Id. at 222-23.
97. Matthew Scheider, Community Policing Nugget Community Policing
Specialists vs. Generalists, COMMUNITY POLICING DISPATCH (Apr. 2008),
http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/april-2008/nugget.htm.
98. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 6.
99. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 94, at 8.
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minority population.100 To the extent that police agencies do engage
with disenfranchised and hostile neighborhoods, there is a tendency
to do so either superficially or intrusively.
01 Agencies tend to
dedicate their scarce resources to highly visible community relations
programs, such as police substations and youth sports programs.
10 2
To the extent that police agencies engage more deeply with
disenfranchised and hostile neighborhoods, there is a tendency to do
so by imposing order rather than by cooperatively facilitating the
organic growth of stable communities. It has proven easier for many
agencies to focus on quality-of-life issues by aggressively responding
to disorder that police officers or commanders perceive as
detrimental to the community.
10 3 Meaningful, long-term community
engagement is time intensive and requires rethinking the
traditional approach to policing that many officers have been
trained in, have seen from peers and mentors, and now take for
granted.
100. Wesley G. Skogan, Community Participation and Community Policing,
in HOW TO RECOGNIZE GOOD POLICING 88, 90 (Jean-Paul Brodeur ed., 1998).
101. See, e.g., Christopher Cooper, Mediation in Black and White: Unequal
Distribution of Empowerment by Police, in NOT GUILTY: TWELVE BLACK MEN
SPEAK OUT ON LAW, JUSTICE, AND LIFE 125, 125-26 (Jabari Asim ed., 2001).
102. See, e.g., Justice Based After-School Program, COMMUNITY ORIENTED
POLICING SERVICES, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item
= 48 5  (last
visited Aug. 24, 2016) (reporting "[t]he Minneapolis Police Department used"
the funds it received from the DOJ's Community Oriented Policing Services
Office "to expand an existing Police Athletic League"). There is a tremendous
amount to be said for frequent, positive contacts between the police and the
public-particularly between officers and teens, and especially between officers
and youth of color-but while such contacts themselves are a necessary
component of improving police-community relations, superficial interactions are
hardly sufficient to build long-term partnerships or result in collaborative
problem solving.
103. Originally articulated in a 1982 article in The Atlantic, "broken
windows" suggests that serious crime is a result of disorder and incivility in the
community. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police
and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive198203broken-windows/3044
6 5/. The appropriate response
was to maintain order by vigorously enforcing minor rules against the source of
disorder: "panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers,
the mentally disturbed." Id. With less disorder leading to petty crime, there
would be less petty crime leading to more serious crime. Id. Police could, in
essence, break the "developmental sequence." Id. Although studies have
supported the idea that increased police focus-"hot-spot policing"--can be an
effective crime reduction strategy, the causal connection between police-
enforced order maintenance and serious crime has been challenged on both
empirical and theoretical grounds. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 123 (2005); Anthony
A. Braga & Brenda J. Bond, Policing Crime & Disorder Hot Spots: A
Randomized Controlled Trial, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 577, 597-600 (2008); Anthony A.
Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized
Controlled Experiment, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 541, 571 (1999).
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Officers must also work with the tools that they are given; the
law grants them broad authority to search and seize but no
authority to unilaterally respond in ways unrelated to criminal
justice. Working solely in a law enforcement capacity, officers
cannot require-and are unqualified to provide-psychological
services, drug or alcohol counseling, food aid, and a range of other
services that would help prevent individual and communal
problems. Implementing an idealized version of community
policing, in which officers are the first point of contact for a host of
social problems and serve to coordinate non-law enforcement
services, is relatively difficult. Officers are simply not trained, just
as police agencies are not structured, to serve as liaisons for the
range of public and private social services that a truly holistic
solution may require. And so officers and agencies default to taking
unilateral action using the authority that they have. All too often,
that has involved aggressively policing minor offenses.104 That
approach has proven counterproductive. Although widely adopted
as a community policing tactic, order-maintenance policing reduces
the potential of police-community partnerships and, ironically
enough, may increase the very crime the police and community
desire to suppress.105
Further, the metrics by which community policing efforts are
measured are often developed by stakeholders other than the
disenfranchised community members themselves.106 These metrics
often do not track the purported goals of the philosophy: to build and
maintain positive partnerships between law enforcement and the
community that can be leveraged to engage in problem-solving
techniques that increase trust while decreasing crime, disorder, and
fear.107 Lacking a reliable and timely way to measure police-
community partnerships, perceived legitimacy and public trust, and
perceptions of disorder and crime, police agencies tend to focus on
quantifiable performance metrics, such as the number of arrests,
stops, and frisks that an officer made or the number of calls that an
104. See Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 14.
105. See Robert J. Kane, Compromised Police Legitimacy as a Predictor of
Violent Crime in Structurally Disadvantaged Communities, 43 CRIMINOLOGY
469, 492 (2005); see also VICTOR M. Rios, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF
BLACK AND LATINO Boys, at xv (2011) (concluding that the negative relationship
that young black and Latino men have with police leads "many of them to fulfill
the destiny expected of them" by engaging in "crime and violence").
106. MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS ASS'N ET AL., ENGAGEMENT-BASED POLICING: THE
WHAT, How, AND WHY OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 12-13 (2015),
https://majorcitieschiefs.comlpdf/news/community-engagement s 527_15.pdf.
107. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 94, at 1-2, 4-5; Scheider, supra note 97.
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officer responded to. l08 Measuring these metrics changes officer
behavior.109 Unfortunately, those performance measures and the
changes they create are often irrelevant and sometimes contrary to
the community policing philosophy.
Community policing remains a noble ideal, but definitional
problems, implementation failures, and a lack of suitable evaluation
metrics have greatly curtailed that ideal's practical importance.110
Worse, agencies and officers that have no sincere interest in altering
the traditional crime-fighting focus of modern law enforcement have
used the rhetoric of community policing as political cover to bolster
legitimacy with a superficial public-relations facelift.111 Worse yet,
they have done so even as a very different paradigm has risen to
prominence: the Police Warrior.
II. THE POLICE WARRIOR
Over the last few years, the law enforcement industry has been
criticized by policing insiders and scholars alike, for its adherence to
a Warrior worldview.112 In this Part, I first explore the many
positive attributes associated with the Warrior concept, explaining
why it has proven to be such a powerfully appealing metaphor for
policing. I then describe how the Warrior ideal has been
misappropriated, the concept twisted to justify attitudes and acts
that fall far short of the principles for which it is supposed to stand.
I conclude that the principles borne of the Warrior concept have
become a problem for modern law enforcement, putting officers and
civilians alike at greater risk, undermining positive police-
community relations, obstructing efforts to prevent and investigate
crime, and frustrating reform.
A. The Warrior Ideal
Military ethicists have long struggled to reconcile the
inevitability and necessity of warfare and violence with the
108. Malcom K. Sparrow, Measuring Performance in a Modern Police
Organization, 2015 NEW PERSP. POLICING 2, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij
/248476.pdf.
109. The New York Police Department's Stop, Question, Frisk fiasco
established rather definitively that in policing, as elsewhere, "what gets
measured gets managed." Larry Prusak, What Can't Be Measured, HARV. Bus.
REV. (Oct. 7, 2010), https:/Jhbr.org/2010/10/what-cant-be-measured (attributing
the saying to Peter Drucker).
110. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 82, at 45.
111. Carl B. Klockars, The Rhetoric of Community Policing, in COMMUNITY
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 239, 239 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D.
Mastrofski eds., 1988).
112. See Rahr & Rice, supra note 14, at 3-4; Seth W. Stoughton, Law
Enforcement's "Warrior" Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225, 226 (2015).
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universal human desire for peace, justice, and stability.113 In the
context of modern policing, the highly venerated Warrior concept is
a simplified attempt to provide an ethical framework for an
inherently violent job. The Warrior appeals to officers' self-image
because it is a heroic and noble figure, imbued with the qualities
that officers most respect and admire. Although there are
tremendous variations in exactly how those qualities are
described,"4 I believe they can be fairly condensed into four
attributes: honor, duty, resolve, and the willingness to engage in
righteous violence.n 5 Together, these attributes are central to the
Warrior ideal, although-as I will discuss shortly-there can be
significant tension between that ideal and the actual practice of
policing.
1. Honor
Warriors serve others, not themselves,116 and do so only for
honorable ends.117 Warriors pursue justice-the triumph of right
over wrong-and they seek to defend the weak from those who
would take advantage of them. But they are not free to do so in any
way that they choose; like the Warrior's goals, the Warrior's
methods must be honorable. Warriors must therefore adhere to a
code of honor that governs their behavior. That standard is created
113. In the military context, the dominant model is the "Just War Theory,"
jus bellum iustum, which sets out a series of criteria that must be met before
war can be considered morally justifiable. Ethicists have divided the criteria
into two groups concerned with the right to initiate war Ous ad bellum) on the
one hand and the actions taken during warfare (jus in bello) on the other. See
CHARLES GUTHRIE & MICHAEL QUINLAN, JUST WAR: THE JUST WAR TRADITION:
ETHICS IN MODERN WARFARE 11 (2007). See generally J. DARYL CHARLES & DAVID
D. COREY, THE JUST WAR TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION (2012) (examining the
Western tradition of rationalizing just violence as necessary to preserve peace);
RICHARD J. REGAN, JUST WAR: PRINCIPLES AND CASES (2d ed. 2013) (discussing
the "Just War Theory" in multiple contexts, including humanitarian
intervention, international law, and nuclear use of force).
114. LARRY F. JETMORE, THE PATH OF THE WARRIOR: AN ETHICAL GUIDE TO
PERSONAL & PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIELD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 106
(2005) ("A warrior uses specific qualities or traits in the service of others. Hope,
trustworthiness, duty, benevolence, mercy, compassion, kindness, innocence,
and a thirst for justice are the traits of a warrior.").
115. Characteristics like honor, duty, and resolve are interrelated and
difficult to define with any level of specificity. I make no attempt to do so in
this Article. Instead, I seek to reflect a general sense of those attributes,
acknowledging that my reflections are both imperfect and incomplete.
116. RICHARD J. MACHOWICZ, UNLEASHING THE WARRIOR WITHIN 183 (2011)
("The Warrior fights because he believes that he is fighting for something good,
something positive, something that will improve the quality of the world around
him.").
117. See, e.g., FORREST E. MORGAN, LIVING THE MARTIAL WAY: A MANUAL FOR
THE WAY A MODERN WARRIOR SHOULD THINK 142 (1992) (identifying honor as
central to the Warrior concept).
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not by law-which is often seen as frustrating, rather than
furthering, justice-but by the norms of the Warrior brotherhood
itself.118 Those norms are restrictive, "set[ting] definite limits on
what warriors can and cannot do if they want to continue to be
regarded as warriors, not murderers or cowards."119
2. Duty
Warriors commit themselves to their honorable mission.
Because that mission has no end, no conclusive moment of triumph,
Warriors must dedicate themselves to a cause, a calling, that they
will never see completed. This commitment to duty demands self-
sacrifice. For the Warrior, it is better to strive against
overwhelming odds and suffer defeat than it is to forsake one's duty.
This is what early eighteenth-century samurai and author
Yamamoto Tsunetomo meant when he wrote, "[T]he way of the
warrior is in death."120 The Warrior does not always win the war
but must have the willingness to face defeat by fighting the war.
One text quotes Theodore Roosevelt, finding in his words "a good
definition of those walking the path of a warrior" 121:
The credit belongs to the persons who are actually in the
arena; those whose face is marred by dust and sweat and
blood; who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again
and again; who knows the great enthusiasms, the great
devotions, and spend themselves in a worthy cause; who, at
the best, knows in the end the triumph of high achievement;
and who, at the worst, fails while daring greatly, so that their
place will never be with those cold and timid souls who know
neither victory nor defeat. 122
3. Resolve
Warriors must be committed to their duty, but that commitment
does not come easily. Warriors must have the resolve, the
determination, the grit not only to "take arms against a sea of
troubles,"123 but to survive the struggle itself. Warriors must
118. KENNETH PAYNE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MODERN CONFLICT: EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY, HUMAN NATURE, AND A LIBERAL APPROACH TO WAR 14 (2015) ("Adhering
to the dictates of [their] small group is the essence of honour
for ... warrior[s].").
119. SHANNON E. FRENCH, THE CODE OF THE WARRIOR: EXPLORING WARRIOR
VALUES PAST AND PRESENT 231 (2003).
120. YAMAMOTO TSUNETOMO, HAGAKURE: THE SECRET WISDOM OF THE
SAMURAI 42 n.2 (Alexander Bennett trans., 2014).
121. JETMORE, supra note 114, at 110.
122. Id. (quoting Theodore Roosevelt, 26th U.S. President, Citizenship in a
Republic (Apr. 23, 1910) (transcript available at http://design.caltech.edu/erik
/Misc/Citizenship-in a Republic.pdf)).
123. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK,
act 3, sc. 1, 1. 59 (John Dover Wilson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1954).
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possess the mental tenacity to survive life-threatening situations
and overwhelming odds, but that by itself is not enough; the need for
resolve is not limited to surviving physical threats. Threats to
Warriors' psychological and emotional well-being are just as
prevalent as, if not more prevalent than, threats to their physical
safety. Warriors must have the mental strength to survive these
trials. They must also have the resolve to do their jobs to the best of
their abilities even in the face of public criticism and when they
believe that the legal and political systems have failed them.
Further, they must have the resolve to complete tasks that they do
not like or even strongly disagree with, such as enforcing laws they
personally oppose and protecting individuals whom they personally
despise.
4. Willingness to Engage in Righteous Violence
A Warrior must be capable of using violence in pursuit of his
goals. In the book On Combat, which has proven tremendously
popular among law enforcement and military personnel, the authors
discuss what they identify as "the gift of aggression."124 While most
people want to close their eyes to the violence and evil of the world
around them, the Warrior recognizes that evil exists and that
violence is sometimes necessary to defend against it. Violence is not
thrust upon the unwilling Warrior. Instead, it is a tool that the
Warrior consciously chooses to use to protect himself and others
from victimization. That choice is not to be made lightly. Rather,
the choice to view violence as a tool, to not be repulsed by that
necessity, must be made deliberately and repeatedly.125 "[I]f you
want to... walk the warrior's path, then you must make a
conscious and moral decision every day to dedicate, equip and
prepare yourself to thrive in that toxic, corrosive moment when the
wolf comes knocking at the door."126 Note the phrasing: not if the
wolf comes knocking, but when. Evil is believed to be inevitable.
When the confrontation comes, as it surely will, the Warrior must be
able to respond. Moreover, the Warrior must want to use violence
when called upon to do so. As On Combat puts it:
After the attacks on September 11, 2001, most of the sheep,
that is, most citizens in America said, "Thank God I wasn't on
one of those planes." The sheepdogs, the warriors, said, "Dear
God, I wish I could have been on one of those planes. Maybe I
could have made a difference." When you are truly
transformed into a warrior and have truly invested yourself
124. DAVE GROSSMAN & LOREN W. CHRISTENSEN, ON COMBAT: THE






into warriorhood, you want to be there. You want to be able to
make a difference.
127
B. The Appeal of the Warrior
Although there are innumerable ways to describe the Warrior
concept, the discussed characteristics-honor, duty, resolve, and the
willingness to engage in righteous violence-represent the
attributes that best define the nobility of policing. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to undergo a complete examination of why those
inside and outside of law enforcement equate good policing with
expressing the traits of the Warrior, but I will offer five reasons
beyond the generic observation that police officers, like anyone else,
are drawn to the idea of casting themselves in the mold of their
heroes.
First and foremost, the Warrior is an attractive concept because
policing is viewed as being critically important; it is thought of as
the last bastion of a free society. In the absence of Warriors who
stand to defend it, civilization itself would crumble. That dramatic
view is depicted in the context of policing by the "Thin Blue Line,"
the well-known symbol of a blue line lying horizontally between two
black lines.
The black line at the top represents the public and order, and
the black line at the bottom represents criminals and chaos.128 The
Thin Blue Line itself represents policing.129  The image is
intentionally evocative, and the Thin Blue Line motif has received
widespread acceptance and approval from officers themselves.
130
127. Id.




130. Frank Borelli, Editor's Blog: Can We PLEASE Take It Off?,
OFFICER.COM (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.officer.com/blog/12177221/can-we-
please-take-off-these-mourning-bands ("The Thin Blue Line and the badge are a
family crest. Once we raise our hand and take that oath, we are bonded.").
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There are multiple variations-including the now famous metaphor
of the sheep, the sheepdog, and the wolf 13 1 -all of which depict law
enforcement as standing alone, the only barrier that protects an
otherwise helpless society. There is a powerful appeal to being
needed and being part of a cause that is far greater than any of the
individuals involved.
Second, the Warrior concept is attractive to law enforcement
because it is exclusive.132 Not everyone is capable of meeting the
high standards that the Warrior role demands. Most people,
according to the common rhetoric, could not survive what the
Warrior must endure. As On Combat puts it, '"While there is
nothing morally superior about the ... warrior, he does have one
real advantage. Only one. He is able to survive and thrive in an
environment that destroys 98 percent of the population."133 Other
people are reluctant to make the sacrifices the Warrior's duty
demands or cannot handle the danger or frustrations of the job.134
Others have the capacity for violence but use it selfishly rather than
in the service of others; these are the predators that the Warrior
stands against, the wolves to the Warrior's sheepdog.135 For these
reasons and more, it is believed most people simply cannot be
Warriors. That exclusivity is appealing, as is the resulting sense of
fraternity among those who are included in the brotherhood. Like
everyone else, officers are attracted to the idea of being part of a
highly selective, elite brotherhood dedicated to a greater good.
Being a member of the Warrior brotherhood brings with it not only a
sense of camaraderie and connection, but also access to specialized
knowledge, training, and equipment that reinforces the special
nature of the Warrior.1 36 The solidarity of this brotherhood also
allows the profession as a whole to associate itself with the heroic
131. In that variation, officers are sheepdogs who use their capacity for
violence to stand between the sheep (the public) and the wolves, i.e., "aggressive
sociopath[ic]" criminals who have "no empathy for [their] fellow citizens."
GROSSMAN & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 124, at 176-77. Grossman also uses the
metaphor of the blue robin's egg, in which officers are the shell protecting
society as it incubates. Id. ("Inside it is soft and gooey, but someday it will grow
into something wonderful. But the egg cannot survive without its hard blue
shell. Police officers, soldiers, and other warriors are like that shell, and
someday the civilization they protect will grow into something wonderful. For
now, though, they need warriors to protect them from the predators.").
132. JETMORE, supra note 114, at 106.
133. GROSSMAN & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 124, at 179.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 177-78.
136. For more on the perceptions among law enforcement officers regarding
specialized knowledge, training, and the effects of those perceptions, see DAVID
A. HARRIS, FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAw ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE 95
(2012); Seth W. Stoughton, Evidentiary Rulings as Police Reform, 69 MIAMI L.
REV. 429, 445-60 (2015).
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deeds of individual officers,137 further enhancing the appeal of
membership-when officers are initiated into the Warrior
brotherhood, they stand shoulder to shoulder with people who have
done great things.
Third, the Warrior ideal relieves cognitive dissonance among
officers, providing a form of psychological protection from the actions
they take and the things they see. Cognitive dissonance theory
holds that people experience psychological discomfort, even pain,
when they hold two mutually inconsistent cognitions-"ideas,
attitudes, beliefs, [or] opinions."138  When individuals experience
dissonance, they unconsciously find a way to reduce the conflict,
either by changing their behaviors or beliefs or by employing
"defense mechanisms and mental tricks such as self-justification,
denial, and distortion."139 In the policing context, dissonance can
result from both police actions and observations. Police officers see
themselves as the "good guys," but their job requires that they take
actions that the laws and moral standards of a free society typically
forbid. "The job," as one officer put it, "runs against every good
impulse you ever had."1 40 Officers deny people liberty by detaining
and restraining them. Officers lock people in cages. Officers invade
privacy by rummaging through pockets and kicking down doors.
Officers beat people into submission.141 Officers kill.14
2 Each of
these actions, in other contexts, would be anathematic to members
of civil society. The Warrior metaphor offers some relief for the
dissonance created by being a "good guy" while doing bad things; it
separates officers from the rest of society-and thus, places them
outside the rules that govern the rest of society-by establishing "a
distinct subculture governed by norms and values designed to
137. Armacost, supra note 11, at 453-54.
138. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. & Christin D. Izett, Irony as Persuasive
Communication, in FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION: SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL INFLUENCES 131, 142 (Herbert L. Colston & Albert N. Katz eds.,
2005); Elliot Aronson, Back to the Future: Retrospective Review of Leon
Festinger's A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 110 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 127, 128
(1997); see LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3 (1957).
139. Andrew J. McClurg, Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Cognitive Dissonance
Theory to Reduce Police Lying, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 394 (1999).
140. MARK BAKER, Cops: THEIR LIVES IN THEIR OWN WORDS 244 (1985).
141. See CHARLES REMSBERG, THE TACTICAL EDGE: SURVIVING HIGH-RISK
PATROL 487 (1986) ("If [a suspect] is still fighting and is not stabilized, you
should not be attempting to handcuff him.... It's control first, then
handcuffing." (emphasis omitted)); Seth W. Stoughton, Modern Police Practices:
Arizona v. Gant's Illusory Restriction of Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest, 97
VA. L. REV. 1727, 1766-67 (2011).
142. See, e.g., Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com
/graphics/national/police-shootings-2
0 16/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2016) (tracking
the number of "people [who] have been shot and killed by police in 2016").
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manage the strain created by an outsider role in the community."143
The Warrior is honorable, which means that the actions an officer
takes in the pursuit of the Warrior ideal are not just acceptable or
justified, but also honorable in and of themselves so long as they
comply with the Warrior's code.144 As criminologist John Crank has
written, the Warrior ideal "allows cops to take righteous pride in
seeking, arresting, and thumping bad guys."145
Officers may also experience dissonance as the result of events
they observe. Officers take an oath to protect society146 and view
themselves as part of the Thin Blue Line, but they are exposed to
situations that leave very little room for faith in human decency or
the value of society itself. They see families turn on each other.
They see the most vulnerable members of society brutally
victimized. They also see their efforts to fight crime and disorder
undermined by what they perceive as legal technicalities-the rules
that a corrupt society has adopted to protect the very criminals who
prey on it. Here, too, the Warrior ideal offers psychological solace.
The tragedy and suffering to which officers are exposed can reaffirm
the need for the Warrior as someone who protects the "good" in
society from the "bad." By adopting the Warrior concept, officers
separate themselves and the darkness of their working reality from
real society-they are on the fringes, in the trenches, fighting the
disorder that threatens to spill over to the "good" neighborhoods and
the families that are worth protecting.47
Fourth, the Warrior worldview offers officers more than
psychological comfort; it also offers their best chance for survival.
Officers are told-repeatedly and by a variety of sources-that hey
need to adopt a Warrior mindset because failing to do so can be
143. John Van Maanen, Observations on the Making of Policemen, 32 HuM.
ORG. 407, 408 (1973).
144. Shannon E. French, The Warrior's Code, AIR U. (2001),
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jscope/french.htm ("The combination of
the warriors' own natural disgust at what they must see in battle and the fact
that what they must do on the battlefield seems so uncivilized, so against what
they have been taught by their society, could make warriors feel tremendous
self-loathing. Warriors need a way to distinguish what they must do out of a
sense of duty from what a serial killer does for the sheer sadistic pleasure of
it.").
145. JOHN P. CRANK, UNDERSTANDING POLICE CULTURE 118 (2d ed. 2015).
146. What is the Law Enforcement Oath of Honor?, INT'L AsS'N CHIEFS
POLICE, http://www.iacp.org/What-is-the-Law-Enforcement-Oath-of-Honor (last
visited Aug. 10, 2016).
147. I make no claim that the Warrior concept alleviates all cognitive
dissonance. To the contrary, research suggests that the cognitive dissonance
created by the demands of policing is responsible for negatively affecting officer
performance by causing "job burnout." Arnold B. Bakker & Ellen Heuven,
Emotional Dissonance, Burnout, and In-Role Performance Among Nurses and
Police Officers, 13 INT'L J. STRESS MGMT. 423, 423 (2006).
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fatal.14 8 The work that officers do is viewed not just as dangerous
but as increasingly dangerous.
149 Would-be officers learn in the
academy, and current officers are frequently reminded, that their
single most important goal every day is simply to make it home at
the end of their shift.150 Officers are taught that every aspect of
policing is intensely dangerous.
151 They hear about these dangers in
their academy,152 from supervisors, and from older peers.
153 These
148. See Seth W. Stoughton, Police Warriors or Community Guardians,
WASH. MONTHLY (Apr. 17, 2015, 9:03 AM), http://washingtonmonthly.com
/2015/04/17/police-warriors-or-community-guardians/.
149. A recent letter to the editor of American Police Beat, for example,
asserts that "police work is now just as, if not more dangerous than ever."
Justin Delaney, Letter to the Editor, Police Work More Dangerous than Ever,
AM. POLICE BEAT, Feb. 2016, at 24. Statements like these are fairly common in
policing. See, e.g., Craig Floyd, Police Dangers Increasing, POLICEONE.COM
(Oct. 3, 2007), https://www.policeone.com/traffic-patrol/articles/13600
3 7 -Police
-dangers-increasing/; Justin George, Baltimore Union Blasts National Leaders
Over Lack of Police Support, POLICEONE.COM (Dec. 21, 2014),
https://www.policeone.com/patrol-issues/articles/8005729-Baltimore-union
.blasts-national-leaders-over-lack-of-police- support/ (quoting a police union
official as saying, "Not since the political unrest of the [1960s] have police
officers been so targeted"); Betsy Brantner Smith, 3 Keys to Preparing for the
Unexpected, POLICEONE.COM (Sept. 1, 2010), https://www.policeone.com
/standoff/tips/2601266-3-keys-to-preparing-for-the-unexpected/ ("We're living in
increasingly dangerous, volatile times ... ").
150. Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TuL. L. REV. 847, 865 (2014); see
SCOTT FIELDEN, THE MIND OF A COP: WHAT THEY Do, AND WHY THEY Do IT 21
(2009); DAVID J. THOMAS, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENT CRIMINALS: INSIGHTS FROM
THE FRONT LINES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 191 (2014). For a critique of this "first
rule of law enforcement," see Charles Huth et al., No "Officer Safety" Exception
to the Constitution, LAW & ORD., Jan. 2015, at 10.
151. A.J. George, Winning a Knife Fight, POLICE MAG. (Feb. 11, 2015),
http://www.policemag.com/channel/weapons/articles/2015/02/winning-a-knife-
fight.aspx ("The dangers we expose ourselves to every time we go [on duty] are
almost immeasurable. We know this the day we sign up and the academy
certainly does a good job of hammering the point home."); Training Day, AM.
POLICE BEAT (Sept. 25, 2015) https://apbweb.comfbaltimore-police-academy
-shooting/ ("There isn't really a part of a cop's job that isn't potentially
dangerous.").
152. Uriel J. Garcia, Experts Say Strongly Worded Police Curriculum Is
Risky with Cadets, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Mar. 22, 2014),
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/newsllocal-news/experts-say-strongly
.worded-police-curriculum-is-risky-with-cadets/article-6fcb7d45-436c-5e48-aa06
-2fc6fdcc35al.html (describing academy materials that inform would-be officers
that criminal suspects "are mentally prepared to react violently" and that
officers "could die today, tomorrow, or next Friday").
153. For a discussion of the relative value that officers place on informal
instruction by older officers, as opposed to formal instruction or empirical
research, see Stoughton, supra note 136, at 455-60.
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messages are reinforced in articles,154 books,155 and training
seminars.156 To deal with these dangers, officers are taught to adopt
a Warrior mindset. That mindset keeps officers safe by reminding
them to stay hypervigilant157 and to avoid complacency5S8 while
giving them the psychological conditioning they need to survive a
life-and-death struggle.159
The final reason the Warrior concept is so attractive to law
enforcement is, unlike the others, external: the Warrior is a reliable
source of political capital. The Warrior culture not only allows
officers to "take righteous pride in seeking, arresting, and thumping
bad guys, [it] provides them with broad social and political supports
for doing so." 16  When policing is framed as a struggle between
Warriors and predators, between right and wrong, it makes it easy
to support the police and difficult to do anything else, such as
criticize individual officers or the profession as a whole. The police
profession and its associations and unions wield tremendous power
on both sides of the political aisle partially because Warrior rhetoric
makes it difficult for elected officials to take positions that could be
viewed as opposing law enforcement.
154. Id.; e.g., Amaury Murgado, Developing a Warrior Mindset, POLICE MAG.
(May 24, 2012), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2012/05
/warrior-mindset.aspx; Charles Remsberg, Warrior Mindset: 8 Elements of
Tactical Performance, POLICEONE.COM (June 5, 2013), http://www.policeone.com
/Officer-Safety/articles/62617 35 -Warrior-mindset-8-elements-of-tactical
-performance/.
155. See, e.g., ALEXIS ARTWOHL & LOREN W. CHRISTENSEN, DEADLY FORCE
ENCOUNTERS: WHAT CoPs NEED TO KNOW TO MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY PREPARE
FOR AND SURVIVE A GUNFIGHT 32 (1997) (mentioning "the ever-increasing
dangers on the street").
156. Seminars dedicated to officer survival, edged-weapon defense, and
deadly-force encounters make up a substantial portion of the training
opportunities offered by private vendors. See, e.g., Officer Survival,
POLICETRAINING.NET, http://policetraining.net/browse/topic?val=28 (last visited
July 14, 2016).
157. Thomas C. Knowles, Cops Aren't Your Enemy, POLITICO MAG. (Dec. 23,
2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/12/cops-arent-your-enemy-
113794.html ("From the start of any police academy, we are taught as cops to be
ever vigilant-to apply laser-like attention to our surroundings at all times.").
158. "Complacency kills" is a well-known phrase among officers. Seth
Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/police-gun
-shooting-training-ferguson/383681/. There are a truly staggering number of
articles warning officers of the dangers of complacency. Popular police author
and trainer Dave Smith described complaints about complacency as a "constant
lament" and attribution of police deaths to complacency as a "common refrain"
in law enforcement circles. Dave Smith, Symptom = Complacency; Disease = ?
OFFICER.COM (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.officer.com/article/ 1 147375/if
-complacency-is-the-symptom-what-is-the-disese.
159. Stoughton, supra note 112, at 226.
160. CRANK, supra note 145, at 118.
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These five characteristics-importance, exclusivity,
psychological protection, survival, and public support-have
combined to make the Warrior the most highly venerated metaphor
for modern policing. As I have written elsewhere:
Officers are trained to cultivate a "warrior mindset," the
virtues of which are extolled in books, articles, interviews, and
seminars intended for a law enforcement audience. An article
in Police Magazine opens with a sentence that demonstrates
with notable nonchalance just how ubiquitous the concept is:
"[Officers] probably hear about needing to have a warrior
mindset almost daily." Modern policing has so thoroughly
assimilated the warrior mythos that, at some law enforcement
agencies, it has become a point of professional pride to refer to
the "police warrior."
161
C. The Evolution of Police Warriors
Given the understandable appeal of the Warrior concept to
modern officers, it should be no surprise many of the most
celebrated aspects of policing are seen as embodying the Warrior
ideal. In this Subpart, I discuss how the Warrior metaphor has been
reinforced by training, equipment, and rhetoric.
The implementation of the Police Warrior began in the mid-
1960s within the LAPD. In the summer of 1965, a routine traffic
stop and drunk-driving arrest in Los Angeles's Watts
neighborhood-a deeply disadvantaged black neighborhood in highly
segregated South Central LA-exploded into a six-day riot that
killed thirty-four people, injured over a thousand others, and caused
an estimated $200 million in property damage (over $1.5 billion in
2015 dollars).162 Police officers faced violent resistance, including
sniper fire and fire bombs.
163 The overwhelmed LAPD called in
California National Guard troops to help restore order within the
fifty-six-square-mile perimeter.
164 In the wake of the riots, Officer
John Nelson and Inspector Darryl Gates, who would later become
the Police Chief, urged the LAPD to form a special squad of officers
who would receive military training and equipment: a "Special
Weapons Attack Team."
165  The idea spread rapidly across the
161. Stoughton, supra note 112, at 225 (footnotes omitted).
162. RADLEY BALKo, RISE OF THE WARRIOR CoP, 51-52 (2013); David 0. Sears
& John B. McConahay, Participation in the Los Angeles Riot, 17 SOC. PROBS. 3,
10-11 (1969); Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?costl=10000000&yearl=1965&year2=2015
(last visited July 18, 2016).
163. John Dart, Defiant Snipers, Police Duel in L.A. Negro Area,
LEOMINSTER ENTER., Aug. 17, 1965, at 1, http://www.rarenewspapers.com
/view/588783 .
164. BALKO, supra note 162, at 52.
165. Id. at 60-62.
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country following the highly publicized University of Texas clock
tower shootings in 1966 and widespread civic unrest.166 The term
for these squads was soon softened to "Special Weapons and
Tactics," ("SWAT") and the teams themselves were used to deal with
rare and volatile situations that patrol officers were not equipped to
handle, such as hostage situations and raids that carried a high risk
of violent confrontation. 167 Officers who made it through a
demanding application process and rigorous training earned the
prestige of being a member of an elite unit; tactical officers were the
Warrior's Warrior, tasked with dangerous and difficult
assignments.168
The development of SWAT teams accelerated the adoption of
Warrior ideals in law enforcement in part because the scope of
SWAT assignments expanded over time. The era in which SWAT
teams were born was an exceptionally dangerous time for police
officers. For the duration of the 1970s, an average of 115 officers
were feloniously killed in the line of duty every year, with a high of
134 officers killed in 1973.169 Even in that environment, however,
SWAT teams were used sparingly, reserved for "volatile, high-risk
situations such as bank robberies and hostage situations."170 Over
time, more police agencies adopted SWAT teams,17 1 and SWAT
teams were deployed more often for circumstances other than the
volatile, high-risk situations that originally justified their existence.
By the early 1980s, there were about three thousand SWAT
deployments every year.172 By 1996, the average had increased ten-
fold, to thirty thousand.173 The next five years saw a 25% increase,
with the average rising to forty thousand deployments every year.174
The increased use did not mirror an increase in crime: between
"1980 and 1995, the number of times that SWAT units were
166. Id. at 58.
167. RADLEY BALKO, OVERKILL: THE RISE OF PARAMILITARY POLICE RAIDs IN
AMERICA 6 (2006), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdfibalko
_whitepaper_2006.pdf.
168. This status has led to the celebration of SWAT teams in popular
culture, further evidencing the tendency to idolize Warrior ideals and imagery.
See, e.g., S.W.A.T. (Colombia Pictures 2003) (bearing the tagline, "Even cops
dial 911"). In addition, dozens of video games portray and glorify SWAT teams.
See, e.g., Michael McWhertor, Meet Rainbow Six Seige's FBI SWAT Operators,
POLYGON (June 4, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://www.polygon.com/2015/6/4/8731885
/rainbow-six-siege-fbi-swat-video (showcasing an FBI SWAT team players may
take control of in a videogame based around SWAT and counterterrorism tactics
and equipment).
169. Law Enforcement Officers Killed, supra note 21.
170. BALKO, supra note 167, at 4.
171. Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American Police:
The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1, 3 (1997).




dispatched increased by 538[%] while the crime rate was flat."'
175
SWAT teams began to be used more frequently for serving search or
arrest warrants, particularly drug-related warrants.
176 Utah, the
only state that currently tracks the deployment of police tactical
teams, reported in 2014 that more than 78% of deployments related
to drugs, while less than 2.5% related to active shooters, barricaded
suspects, and hostage situations combined.
177
The creation and expansion of SWAT teams may be the most
explicit example of the shift to a more militarized, Warrior-like
police force, but it is hardly the only one.
178 Over the last several
decades, equipment and tactics once reserved for SWAT operatives
have been gradually made available to ordinary officers.
In February 1997, two heavily armed gunman robbed a bank in
North Hollywood, California, and engaged in a prolonged shoot-out
with the police.179 The robbers, armed with automatic rifles and
wearing heavy body armor, held a crowd of officers at bay for almost
twenty minutes.80 Only after the LAPD SWAT team arrived were
the robbers brought down.
18' The North Hollywood bank robbery
led to a nationwide reevaluation of how patrol officers were
equipped, and police agencies across the country began to give at
least some patrol officers heavier weapons than the standard-issue
pistol and shotgun that had proven ineffective in North
Hollywood.8 2 The AR-15 rifle, a semiautomatic, civilian version of
the military's M-16 rifle, became the weapon of choice for patrol
officers.8 3  Police agencies began issuing rifles to officers or
permitting officers who had gone through the appropriate training
to carry a personally owned rifle.'
8 4
175. Edward Ericson, Commando Cops, ORLANDO WKLY. (May 7, 1998),
http://www.orlandoweekly.com/orlando/commando-cops/
C ontent?oid= 22 643 12.
176. BALKO, supra note 167, at 4.
177. UTAH COMM'N ON CRIMINAL & JUVENILE JUSTICE, 2014 LAW
ENFORCEMENT TRANSPARENCY REPORT 5 (2015), http://libertasutah.org/drop
/sb185_2014.pdf.
178. See generally BALKO, supra note 162 (exploring politics and policies that
have lead the police to become "soldiers" in the wars on crime, drugs, and
terror); Peter Kraska, The Military-Criminal Justice Blur: An Introduction, in
MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (Peter Kraska ed.,
2001) (examining the increasing lack of "traditional distinctions between
military, police, and criminal justice").
179. BALKO, supra note 162, at 228-29.
180. Id. at 229.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 229-30.
183. Bob Parker, How the North Hollywood Shootout Changed Patrol




184. After going through forty hours of training to be certified as a Patrol
Rifle Operator, I kept a personally owned AR-15 in a special locking mechanism
in my police vehicle while on patrol.
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Just over two years after the North Hollywood bank robbery,
another horrific event led to a further adjustment of police tactics.
At the time, the conventional police response to a hostage situation
called for patrol officers to set up a perimeter around the scene and
wait for a SWAT team.18 5 The prevailing belief was that the safe
recovery of hostages was best left to trained negotiators or well-
equipped entry teams.18 6  But in April 1999, two seniors at
Columbine High School went on an hour-long rampage, killing
thirteen people and injuring thirty-five more before taking their own
lives.187 Officers set up a perimeter during the shooting and waited
for the SWAT team to respond, but SWAT did not make entry until
almost two hours after the shooting started.88 After Columbine,
police agencies and trainers were faced with the unpleasant reality
that, in some cases, waiting for specialized units gave a hostage
taker more time to kill victims. Establishing a perimeter and
waiting for specialized units would remain the appropriate tactic in
some cases, such as static hostage situations or barricaded subjects
without hostages, but active shooter situations required a different
approach. Officers are now taught that the first officer or officers on
scene should aggressively search for active shooters with an eye to
eliminating the threat in the shortest possible time.18 9 This shift in
policy and tactics has required a change in equipment and training.
As Professor J. Pete Blair told the Police Executive Research
Foundation in 2014, "We have seen attackers barricade themselves
in, so we need police to have the skills and techniques and
equipment to get in and stop the killing."190 Today, it is common for
rank-and-file officers to be given at least some of the dynamic entry
and rapid room-clearing training that had previously been reserved
for SWAT units.191
The need for specialized training and equipment has spawned
private industry and advertising that further reinforces Warrior
ideals. Advertisements that appear in popular, police-oriented
publications, such as Police Magazine and American Police Beat,
often capitalize on Warrior imagery.192 Advertisements for rifles
185. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES:
THE POLICE RESPONSES TO AcTIvE SHOOTER INCIDENTS 1 (2014),
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical IssuesSeries/the%20police%20
responoe%2 0to°%20aetivo%20shooter%20incidento%20201 4.pdf.
186. Id. at 1-2.
187. Id. at 1.
188. BALKO, supra note 162, at 231-32.
189. Some agencies train officers to enter an active shooting scene
individually and without backup, while other agencies train officers to work in
pairs or small groups. See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 185, at
8-10.
190. Id. at 6.
191. Id. at 13.
192. See POLICE MAG., Jan. 2016, at 19, 31.
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and tactical gear, such as "through-wall" radar systems, are
ubiquitous, of course, but even products and services marketed for
use by regular patrol officers are presented in a heavily militarized
way. A recent issue of Police Magazine, for example, contains
advertisements by clothing manufacturers 5.11 and Dickies
picturing officers wearing tactical vests and carrying rifles as they
step out of police helicopters.
193 An ad for a Chevrolet Tahoe is
captioned, "A new way to dominate the pursuit."'
194  Some
advertisements hew even closer to Warrior rhetoric. Gun
manufacturer Sig Sauer urges readers to "[u]nleash the warrior
spirit" by purchasing a Legion series handgun.
195 It offers the
following inducement: "Welcome to Legion. Bound together by the
greatest demands and the highest expectations. Our most popular
platforms with the most requested enhancements. Purpose built.
Performance tested. Only for the elite few."'
96
The police community itself has reinforced the message that
courage under fire is the single most important characteristic of a
successful officer. Every year, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police ("IACP") identifies a "Police Officer of 
the Year."1 97
The award recognizes "exemplary performance in 
police work"'' 9
and "outstanding and heroic achievement."'
199 In the hyperlocalized
world of policing, which is dominated by small agencies,
200 receiving
recognition from one of the oldest, largest, and best-regarded
international policing bodies is a big deal. The award "symbolizes
the highest level of achievement among police officers,"
201 and
officers who are selected to receive the award are presented as role
models for the profession. In the thirty-year period from 1986 to
2015, twenty-five recipients were honored for actions they took in
combat conditions while under attack.
20 2 Make no mistake, those
officers, and countless others, deserve to be honored for their heroic,
193. Id. Another advertisement in the same issue, this one by clothing
manufacturer Vertx, shows two patrol officers moving through a dilapidated
hallway with their guns drawn. Id. at 43.
194. Id. at 7.
195. Id. at 75.
196. Id.
197. Police Officer of the Year, INT'L AsS'N CHIEFS POLICE,
http://www.iacp.org/poy (last visited July 19, 2016).
198. 2005 IACP Awards, POLICE CHIEF MAG.,
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/issues/12006/PDFS/IACP-Annual
_Awards.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2016).
199. Police Officer of the Year, supra note 197.
200. About half of local police agencies have fewer than ten sworn officers,
and fewer than 650 of the more than twelve thousand local police agencies have
more than one hundred officers. REAVES, supra note 21, at 3.
201. 2005 IACP Awards, supra note 198.
202. Police Officer of the Year Honorees, INT'L AsS'N CHIEFS POLICE,
http://www.iacp.org/POYStories. Thirty-one awards were issued over that
thirty-year period; two officers were honored in 2011. Id.
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life-saving actions in the face of an imminent lethal threat.203 It
does not diminish their heroism in any way to point out that
consistently identifying courage under fire as the "highest level of
achievement among police officers" reinforces the Warrior
worldview. 204
Police industry groups such as the IACP are not the only
entities to have contributed to the Warrior metaphor. The federal
government has done so as well, characterizing officers as soldiers in
the War on Crime announced by President Johnson in 1965,205 the
War on Drugs announced by President Nixon in 1971,206 and the
War on Terrorism announced by President Bush in 2001.207 Warrior
terminology has found its way into policy statements from both
high-level elected officials trying to bolster public support and
officials charged with implementing the resulting programs.
Political affiliation is all but irrelevant; officials in both parties and
different administrations have embraced Warrior rhetoric or the
ideas behind it. In the 1980s, President Reagan and Attorney
General William French Smith "utterly dehumanize[d] drug users,
cast the drug fight as a biblical struggle between good and evil, and
203. When I served as an officer at the Tallahassee Police Department, Iworked with and knew Officer Scott Angulo, who won the IACP's Police Officer
of the Year Award in 2015 for his response-while at home and off duty-to an
active shooter who had set a house on fire so he could ambush first responders,
killing a sheriffs deputy and injuring another. Id. I could not be more
impressed with Officer Angulo's heroism and bravery.
204. Interestingly, the focus of the IACP's Police Officer of the Year award
has shifted over time. In the twenty-year period from 1966 to 1985, the award
was given only three times for actions taken under combat conditions. Id. The
majority of the awards in that time were given for life-saving efforts or for
career or life-time achievements rather than specific incidents. Id. It is also
worth noting that a few agencies have recently begun rewarding officers forsuccessfully de-escalating dangerous interactions, formally treating those
awards as the equivalent of more traditional awards for valor. Errin Haines
Whack, Police Departments Begin to Reward Restraint Tactics, AP(May 31, 2016, 12:47 PM), http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article
/8 9 8 f 72 aa8c2b4cd7bf099f9200759c2e/police-departments-begin.reward-restraint
-tactics. It remains to be seen whether those awards are informally equated
with awards for valor.
205. See ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON
CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1, 79 (2016); Elizabeth
Hinton, Why We Should Reconsider the War on Crime, TIME (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://time.com/3746059/war-on-crime-history/.
206. ELAINE B. SHARP, THE DILEMMA OF DRUG POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
1-2 (1994) (quoting President Nixon as saying, "America's public enemy
number one in the United States is drug abuse. In order to fight and defeat this
enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive.").
207. George W. Bush, 43rd U.S. President, Address to a Joint





in the process turn[ed] the country's drug cops into holy soldiers."
208
In 1994, President Clinton's Attorney General, Janet Reno, opened a
discussion with federal defense and intelligence experts about how
they could support local law enforcement by saying, "[L]et me
welcome you to the kind of war our police fight every day. And let
me challenge you to turn your skills ... to helping us with the war
we're now fighting daily in the streets and our towns and cities
across the nation."20 9 President Clinton advanced this metaphor in
1996 when he appointed General Barry McCaffrey, a decorated
combat veteran and Army Ranger, as the director of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy.
210
The federal government's wars on crime, drugs, and terror have
also been major conduits for equipping police forces with military-
grade equipment and training. "Over the last 20 years, Congress
has encouraged the U.S. military to supply intelligence, equipment,
and training to civilian police."211 The Defense Logistics Agency's
Law Enforcement Support Office administered the 1033 Program
that transferred military equipment to local law enforcement
agencies and adopted the tagline, "From warfighter to
crimefighter. 212  The metaphor was clear: police officers were
soldiers, and their day-to-day job involved fighting on the front
lines.2
13
The judicial branch has also reinforced policing's Warrior
culture. The courts have privileged law enforcement interests,
affirmed the image of officers as uniquely skilled crime fighters
working in a hostile environment, and resisted the notion that
policing practices are problematic or, if they are problematic, that
the problems are the result of systemic issues.
208. BALKO, supra note 162, at 139.
209. Diane Cecilia Weber, Police Develop 'Military Mind Set, BALT. SUN
(Sept. 12, 1999), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-09-12/topic19909150450
1civilian-affairs-military-assistance-mount-carmel.
210. Diane Cecilia Weber, Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of
Paramilitarism in American Police Departments, 50 CATO INST. BRIEFING PAPER
2 (1999), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.orglfiles/pubs/pdflbp50.pdf.
211. Id.
212. The Department of Defense Excess Property Program in Support of U.S.
Law Enforcement Agencies: An Overview of DOD Authorities, Roles,
Responsibilities, and Implementation of Section 1033 of the 1997 National
Defense Authorization Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 77 (2014)
(statement of the American Civil Liberties Union).
213. The federal government has not always provided a consistent message
to local law enforcement agencies. In the same year that Attorney General
Reno was describing the "war" that local officers were fighting, the Community
Oriented Policing Services Office was established in the Department of Justice
to distribute and monitor funds pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994. The COPS Office: 20 Years of Community Oriented
Policing, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES. (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?ltem=2754.
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The Supreme Court has consistently privileged policing through
its tendency to determine whether constitutional regulation is
appropriate-and, if so, what type of regulation is appropriate-in
part by assessing whether the proposed rule would burden law
enforcement.214 The Court regularly refuses to adopt rules that it
believes would hinder law enforcement's interests. The Court's
approach in Wyoming v. Houghton2 15-which held that probable
cause to search a vehicle included the legal authority to search
passengers' belongings in the vehicle that could conceal the object of
the search-was typical; without such authority, the Court
reasoned, "[e]ffective law enforcement would be appreciably
impaired."216 Similarly, in California v. Acevedo,2 17 the Court held
that earlier automobile exception cases, which had distinguished
between cars and containers in cars, "impeded effective law
enforcement."218  On some occasions, the Court has adopted a
particular rule only with the understanding that it will not impede
effective law enforcement. In Tennessee v. Garner,219 for example,
the Court concluded that there was no evidence that officers needed
to be able to use deadly force to prevent the escape of a nonviolent
felony suspect.220 The Court came to a similar conclusion recently
when it overturned a Los Angeles city ordinance requiring hotels to
allow officers access to hotel registries on demand; in most cases
officers did not need that authority because, the Court reasoned,
officers could rely on consent or administrative subpoenas.221 And
in Miranda v. Arizona,222 the Court imposed the now-familiar
214. See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2453 (2015); Missouri
v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1567-68 (2013); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S.
778, 796 n.5 (2009); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304 (1999); California
v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586-87 (1991); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 12 (1990)
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("Apparently the mere possibility of a minor burden on
law enforcement interests is enough to generate corrective action by this
Court."); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 441 (1984); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 760 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221 (1981); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 792-93
(1977); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 457 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 481 (1966); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 156 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 106 (1959) (Clark, J.,
dissenting); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); Carter v.
Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 186 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
215. 526 U.S. 295.
216. Id. at 304, 307.
217. 500 U.S. 565.
218. Id. at 574.
219. 471 U.S. 1.
220. Id. at 19.
221. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2453 (2015).
222. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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warning requirement only after describing how "the Federal Bureau
of Investigation ha[d] compiled an exemplary record of effective law
enforcement while advising any suspect or arrested person" of the
right to remain silent.
223
The courts, including the Supreme Court, have also affirmed
the image of officers as highly skilled crime-fighting professionals.
For example, officers are credited as having an "almost instinctive"
ability to separate questions related to officer safety from questions
intended to obtain testimonial evidence.224 Further, by virtue of
their "experience and specialized training," officers can "make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person."'
225 It
is this knowledge that permits officers to identify even entirely
lawful conduct as potentially dangerous226 or criminal.
227 Courts
have broadly deferred to police assertions of expertise or specialized
knowledge.228 At times, this deference can be quite explicit.
229 In
other cases, it is implicit in the courts' rote mentions or descriptions
of an officer's training and experience.
230
The way that courts describe the policing environment provides
an additional endorsement of the Warrior image. The Supreme
Court has indicated that policing is generally dangerous
231 and has
also identified particular aspects of policing that are especially so:
traffic stops,232 approaching stopped vehicles,
233 investigative
223. Id. at 483.
224. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006) (citing New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1984)).
225. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
226. See Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 991 (2012).
227. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).
228. See Stoughton, supra note 136, at 446-55.
229. E.g., United States v. Martin, 679 F. Supp. 2d 723, 734 (W.D. La. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2006)) (stating
that judges are "generally obliged to accord deference and even 'great respect' to
an officer's training and experience").
230. See United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 35 (1st Cir. 2014) (observing
that courts have "with a regularity bordering on the echolalic, endorsed the
concept that a law enforcement officer's training and experience may yield
insights that support a probable cause determination"); see also Stoughton,
supra note 136, at 455 (discussing the tendency of courts to accept officers as
experts).
231. E.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 n.10 (1996) ("Police officers
engaged in the dangerous and difficult tasks associated with protecting the
safety of our communities not only confront the risk of physical harm but also
face stressful circumstances that may give rise to anxiety, depression, fear, or
anger."); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636 n.3 (1977) (per curiam) ("We
recognize that the life of a police officer is a dangerous one.").
232. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009); Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1047-48 (1983).
233. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) (per curiam).
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detentions,234 and entering homes unannounced.235 The Court's
widely quoted description of situations in which police must make
use-of-force decisions reflects its view "that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments ... in circumstances which
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving."236 The limited time and
inherent uncertainty in use-of-force situations-combined, perhaps,
with officer's specialized training and experience, although the
Court has never explicitly connected the two--have led the Court to
conclude that courts should generally defer to officers' use-of-force
decisions.237
The image of the highly trained Warrior also finds support in
the Court's view of police professionalism. "The Court has only
rarely credited fears that police officers will attempt to circumvent
the constitutional limits to their authority."238 To the contrary, it is
far more common for the Court to rely on the "increasing
professionalism of police forces."239  Officers "across the United
States," the Court has said, "take the constitutional rights of citizens
seriously."240  To that end, officers "take care to learn what is
required of them under Fourth Amendment precedent
and... conform their conduct to th[o]se rules."241 In accordance
with that belief, the Court has generally been skeptical of the notion
that officers will engage in gamesmanship. In Heien v. North
Carolina,242 when the Court held that an investigatory stop could be
predicated on an officer's reasonable mistake of law, it resisted the
suggestion that such a rule would give officers an incentive to not
learn the law.243  And when it prohibited police from using
roadblock-style checkpoints for drug interdiction or other "ordinary
criminal wrong-doing," the Court paid little attention to the
possibility that police agencies could engage in substantially the
same behavior so long as they identified a permissible purpose for
the checkpoint.244  Most recently, several justices were deeply
234. Long, 463 U.S. at 1047.
235. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
236. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). This phrasing has
proven widely accepted, appearing in thousands of lower court opinions, briefs,
and model jury instructions. Stoughton, supra note 150, at 865. For a criticism
of the Court's focus on the split-second moment in which officers use force, see
Brandon L. Garrett & Seth W. Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 102
VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=2754759.
237. See Stoughton, supra note 150, at 861-65.
238. Id. at 861.
239. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598-99.
240. Id.
241. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011) (quoting Hudson, 547
U.S. at 599).
242. 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
243. Id. at 539-40.
244. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41, 46-47 (2000).
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skeptical that officers would unlawfully stop civilians to check for
outstanding warrants even if the fruits of a search incident to arrest
on that warrant were admissible.245 Even when an individual officer
does not live up to professional standards, the Court has been
reluctant to fault law enforcement generally.246 In concluding that
officers could constitutionally make arrests for any violation
classified as criminal by state law, regardless of whether state law
authorized arrest or jail time, the Court indicated that concerns
about police abuse were speculative at best: "[S]urely the country is
not confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-
offense arrests."
247
The Warrior concept "provides a moral-emotional identity for
police as warriors in the war against crime."248 Bolstered by the
training and equipment that officers receive, particularly after the
Columbine and September 11th attacks; by the marketing that
saturates police-oriented publications; by law enforcement industry
groups; by the rhetoric used at various times by the federal
government; and by judicial decisions that often reflect and reinforce
officers' self-perceptions, it should be no surprise that the Warrior
culture has put down strong roots in modern policing.
D. The Corruption of the Warrior Ideal
The Warrior concept has undeniable appeal to law enforcement
audiences. Perhaps that appeal made the corruption of the Warrior
principles all but inevitable. The Warrior principles are admirable,
but in practice, policing all too often fails to live up to those ideals.
Troublingly, Warrior rhetoric is often invoked to explain or justify
behaviors inconsistent with or outright contrary to policing's mission
of public service and the Warrior's core values of honor, duty, and
resolve. Despite the best of intentions, the Warrior concept
promotes an adversarial style of policing that estranges the public
and contributes to unnecessary conflict and violence. Further, it
offers a way for officers to rationalize bad acts and resist criticism.
245. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016). Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor, on the other hand, appeared much more sympathetic to concerns
about potential abuse. Id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
246. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001).
247. Id. at 353 & n.25. But see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479 (1963) (mentioning "[tihe history of the use, and not infrequent abuse, of
the power to arrest").
248. CRANK, supra note 145, at 118 (discussing "militarism"); see also John
Van Maanen, The Asshole, in POLICING: A VIEW FROM THE STREET 221 (Peter K.
Manning & John Van Maanen eds., 1978), reprinted in POLICE & SOCIETY:
TOUCHSTONE READINGS 346, 347 (Victor E. Kappeler ed., 2d ed. 1999)
(describing "heroic self-perceptions reflecting moral superiority").
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1. Creating Unnecessary Conflicts
Under a Warrior worldview, police legitimacy is founded in
criminal law, the unique ability of officers to enforce it, and the code
that officers must adhere to. Criminal law serves as an external
source of legitimacy-officers, as many are often quick to point out,
merely enforce the law; they do not make it. While public support
for policing may be preferable in this worldview, it is not
essential.249 And because public support is not viewed as an
essential part of policing, the need to secure public trust is often
given a low priority by rank-and-file officers.250 In some cases,
officers may even view public trust as counterproductive.25 1 When
officers do not appreciate the importance of public trust, they have
no motivation to act in a way that increases that trust.
In combination with the low value that many officers put on
public trust, training that teaches officers to be hypervigilant to
potential threats can lead officers to adopt an adversarial approach
to civilian interactions that effectively precludes good police-
community relations. Because officers are Warriors, they are
trained to consider each civilian they interact with as a potential
threat and to approach every civilian interaction as a potential
deadly-force encounter.252 For their own safety, officers are taught
that they need to take control of a scene-to exhibit an authoritative
"command presence." According to Erwin Chemerinsky, who
249. This view, and the perception of the police role as one of society's elite
protectors, are a far cry from the Peelian Principles that emphasized the need
for public trust and the concept that "the police are the public and that the
public are the police." See Home Office, supra note 28.
250. Indeed, line officers and union officials often criticize police executives
for responding to community concerns or taking steps designed to appease the
public, which is often viewed as failing to support the officers. See, e.g., Kate
Mather, Union Official: LAPD Chief Lost Support of Officers After Saying One
Should Be Charged, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016, 6:45 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-venice-shooting-union
-20160112-story.html.
251. When someone trusts the police, they do not fear them, but sometimes
officers rely on people's fear as a motivation for compliance. See, e.g., BAKER,
supra note 140, at 229-33 (relating one officer's description of how he used
scare tactics to keep prostitutes off the streets, including threatening to break
their legs, driving onto sidewalks as if he would run them over, and leading
them to believe that he had killed other prostitutes); Adam Braskich, Opinion,
Stop Demanding the Impossible of Police, BALT. SUN (May 15, 2015),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-freddie-gray-cops
-20150516-story.html.
252. RONALD J. ADAMS ET AL., STREET SURVIVAL 155 (1980) ("As you approach
any situation, you want to be in the habit of looking for cover[ ] so you can react
automatically to reach it should trouble erupt."); John Bennett, How Command
Presence Affects Your Survival, POLICEONE.COM (Oct. 7, 2010),
https://www.policeone.com/Officer-Safety/articles/2748139-How-command
-presence-affects-your-survival/ ("Remain humble and compassionate; be
professional and courteous[,] and have a plan to kill everyone you meet.").
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studied the LAPD's internal investigation following the Rampart
scandal, officers were taught: "You are in charge, you have to show
everyone you are in charge. Be decisive. Have command
presence."253 Command presence is important because, inter alia, it
is believed to deter criminals from thinking that officers are easy
marks.
254
Officers are trained to take control by using an "Ask, Tell,
Make" approach in interactions with civilians.
255 Officers first ask a
civilian to do something.256 If the civilian does not do as requested,
the officer orders the civilian to comply.
257 If the civilian does not
comply with the order, the officer forces the civilian to comply, using
violence as it is needed.258 This approach is viewed as necessary, or
at least as advisable, because it ensures that the officer remains in
253. Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police
Department's Board of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 545, 563 (2001). For a discussion of the gendered implications of command
presence, see generally Frank R. Cooper, "Who's the Man?" Masculinities
Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671 (2009).
254. ANTHONY J. PINIZZOTTO ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT
ENCOUNTERS: A STUDY OF FELONIOUS ASSAULTS ON OUR NATION'S LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 19 (2006), http://www.fairfaxcounty.gov
/policecommission/materials/band-readahead.pdf [http://perma.cc/4UJB-69XK];
Bennett, supra note 252. The concept of command presence has been criticized
for its association with masculinity and, when included as part of an evaluative
process, may lend itself to gender discrimination. See THE WOMEN'S ADVISORY
COUNCIL TO THE L.A. POLICE COMM'N, A BLUEPRINT FOR IMPLEMENTING GENDER
EQUITY IN THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 39-41 (1993). As with much of
the terminology in policing, however, command presence is capable of different
meanings, some of which are unrelated, at least on the surface, to masculinity
or aggression. See GERALD W. GARNER, COMMON SENSE POLICE SUPERVISION:
PRACTICAL TIPS FOR THE FIRST-LINE LEADER 81-83 (4th ed. 2008).
255. Former SWAT Commander Speaks Out on Police Militarization, the





258. Id.; see also Caitlin Doornbos, Law Enforcement Policy, Training Offer
Guidance on Potentially Lethal Situations, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD (May 9,
2015), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2015/may/09/law-enforcement-policy
-training-offer-guidance-pot/ (describing training at a Kansas sheriffs office);
Ray Stern, No Respect: A Prickly Professor's Violent Arrest by a Badge-Heavy
Cop Brings Out the Bully in ASU, PHx. NEW TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015),
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/no-respect-a-prickly-professors-violent
-arrest-by-a-badge-heavy-cop-brings-out-the-buly-in-asu-7287384 (describing
training at an Arizona police academy). There is an important racial and class
dynamic to this observation, as officers who use "Ask, Tell, Make" with
constituents who lack social or political capital may instead adopt a softer
approach--one that emphasizes requesting, explaining, and convincing-with
constituents they perceive as wielding social or political power. See, e.g.,
Cooper, supra note 101, at 125, 125-26.
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control and-denies the civilian the opportunity to physically resist.259
Unfortunately, officers who internalize the Warrior perception have
sometimes applied this approach even in the absence of legal
authority to issue the order in the first place.2 60 Whether bolstered
by lawful authority or not, an approach that emphasizes compliance
over cooperation creates conflicts a different cultural norm might
well avoid.
261
The Warrior concept discourages officers from thinking of
themselves as members of the public. As the embodiment of the
Thin Blue Line, rather than the society that it protects, officers "feel
more comfortable distancing themselves from subjects mentally,
physically, and emotionally."262 When officers view themselves as a
member of an elite crime-fighting profession, and when that view is
reaffirmed by others in the profession, officers come to expect
civilians to share that view and to treat officers with a certain level
of respect and deference. From the officer's point of view, the officer
is an authority figure that must be respected and obeyed.263 Indeed,
officers may be taught formally or informally to demand respect.26 4
Under this worldview, disrespect is tantamount to resistance, and
resistance indicates that an individual is one of the "bad guy[s]," an
"enemy."265  A civilian who does not accept the police officer's
259. See, e.g., Luckydog, Comment to Ask Tell Make, OFFICER.COM (June 25,
2008, 2:15 AM), http://forums.officer.com/t94124/ ("[I] dont [sic] like arguing
with people while giving them time to sit there and come up with a plan.").
260. Such was the case with the Ferguson Police Department. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (Mar. 4, 2015)
("Officers expect and demand compliance even when they lack legal authority.
They are inclined to interpret the exercise of free-speech rights as unlawful
disobedience, innocent movements as physical threats, [and] indications of
mental or physical illness as belligerence.").
261. Both the Christopher Commission and the LAPD's post-Rampart
investigation explicitly tied "command presence" to unnecessary aggression by
officers. See INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 99 (1991);
Chemerinsky, supra note 253, at 569; Thomas M. Riordan, Copping an Attitude:
Rule of Law Lessons from the Rodney King Incident, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 675,
727-28 (1994).
262. BAKER, supra note 140, at 208.
263. Indeed, officers frequently bemoan modern society's failure or refusal to
teach youth to respect authority.
264. Marcel F. Beausoleil, Police Abuse, in THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1372, 1375 (Wilbur R. Miller
ed., 2012) ("When police officers believe that a citizen has a bad attitude because
he/she is openly defiant or disrespectful, they may resort to some form of abuse
in order to 'correct' the attitude problem. It is a way for the police to take
control of the situation, to show that they are in charge, and to ensure that the
citizen will act 'respectfully' toward the police in future encounters.").
265. John W. Whitehead, Resistance Is Futile: The Violent Cost of
Challenging the American Police State, RUTHERFORD INST.
(Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.rutherford.org/publications-resources/john
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understanding of the interaction is, in John Van Maanen's classic
taxonomy, an "asshole."266 Assholes are undeserving of respect and
must be taught the consequences of "contempt of cop."
2 67 "The police
are trained to believe that they must always be in control and that
they must win in every encounter. Therefore, disrespect cannot be
tolerated and must be rectified."
268
Sociologists Richard Sykes and Edward Brent termed this an
"asymmetric deference norm" and observed that officers expect
civilians to acknowledge their inferior status and defer
accordingly.26 9 But a civilian interacting with an officer may
perceive the officer's expectation of deference as an entitled,
unnecessary display of dominance, a sign of disrespect from the
officer. "Because the actors are not responding [to each other] as
expected [by either party to] the encounter, the defiance between
them escalates. As both actors discredit each other, they exchange
roles as threatening and threatened."270  In 1968, the Supreme
Court noted one of the more problematic aspects of policing's
adoption of Warrior principles: "officers' perceived need to maintain
the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished
by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control on
the streets."271 The Department of Justice's Investigation of the
Ferguson Police Department notes a similar phenomenon: "Force at
times appeared to be used as punishment for non-compliance with
an order that lacked legal authority."272 Because few people like
being humiliated or gratuitously ordered about, an officer's
expectation of and insistence on deference increases the potential for
conflict. This may be particularly true in times of tension between
the police and the community.
_whiteheads-commentary/resistance isfutile the-violentcost of challenging
the americanpolicest.
266. Van Maanen, supra note 248, at 346, 355.
267. JACK L. COLWELL & CHARLES HUTH, UNLEASHING THE POWER OF
UNCONDITIONAL RESPECT: TRANSFORMING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND POLICE
TRAINING 45, 89 (2010) ("It has become fashionable for officers to adopt an
adversarial perspective toward the public, especially when they perceive the
public as being unsupportive or overly critical of their actions. This distorted
perception reinforces the idea that the police are a separate entity from the
public and can result in a pattern of self-justification that can be used to
legitimize rudeness, a lack of empathy, and, in some cases, illegal behavior.
This kind of unconscious programming-reaffirmed over hundreds of
interactions and years of typecasting-is the inevitable result of a police culture
that has slowly drifted away from a service mentality.").
268. Beausoleil, supra note 264, at 1372, 1375.
269. RICHARD E. SYKES & EDWARD E. BRENT, POLICING: A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST
PERSPECTIVE 101 (1983).
270. ALPERT & DUNHAM, supra note 54, at 41.
271. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.11 (1968) (quoting LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY
ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME 47-48 (Frank J. Remington ed., 2d ed. 1967)).
272. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 260, at 34-35.
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The traffic stop that ended with the arrest of Sandra Bland, a
Black Lives Matter activist, by Texas Trooper Brian Encinia on July
10, 2015, provides a compelling example. During the course of the
traffic stop, Trooper Encinia observed that Ms. Bland "seem[ed] very
irritated."27 3  She was; she was pulled over for changing lanes
without using her turn signal, but, according to her account, she did
so only to move out of the way of Trooper Encinia's vehicle, which
had been accelerating behind her.274 Her irritation did not sit well
with Trooper Encinia, who paused for several seconds before asking
dismissively, "Are you done?"275 The trooper then asked Ms. Bland
to put out her cigarette.276 She refused.277 At that point, Trooper
Encinia put his pen back in his pocket, placed his ticket book on Ms.
Bland's car, and commanded Ms. Bland to get out of the car.278 Ms.
Bland refused, challenging his authority to order her out.279 Trooper
Encinia then invoked his authority by threatening and ultimately
using force to arrest Ms. Bland.280 Trooper Encinia had been
prepared to issue a warning ticket while Ms. Bland was seated in
her car but changed his approach when she did not defer as he
expected.2s' The result was a use of force and a custodial arrest that
were both entirely avoidable.
As the Sandra Bland traffic stop and arrest demonstrates, an
unnecessarily aggressive or domineering attitude can put officers
and civilians alike at risk in individual encounters in which a
different approach may have avoided a physical altercation
altogether. But the officers and civilians involved in individual,
avoidable incidents are not the only ones at risk. An adversarial
approach to policing sets the stage for broader social problems.
After Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson fatally shot Michael
Brown on August 9, 2014, two distinct narratives emerged. One
story, first laid out in a press conference the day after the shooting,
was that Brown had already assaulted Officer Wilson once and was
threateningly advancing toward the officer at the time he was
273. Seth Stoughton, Cop Expert: Why Sandra Bland's Arrest Was Legal but










281. See id. While in a jail cell three days after her arrest, Sandra Bland
took her own life. Id. That ultimate, tragic consequence of what should have
been a fairly minor traffic stop raises a host of issues about the criminal justice
system that are outside the scope of this Article.
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shot.282 The other story, reflected in the statements quoted by news
media, was that Brown had been executed with his hands raised in
surrender when he was shot.
283 Why was the second story accepted
by individuals and organizations around the country, especially
given the lack of extrinsic evidence?
284 Why was the story reported
by the officer and the agency viewed as false? The answer, quite
simply, is that the community did not trust the police. The ensuing
protests, looting, and confrontations between officers and civilians
were less the result of Michael Brown's death than they were the
result of the deeply fractured relationship between the local police
agencies and the community. That relationship had fractured, the
Department of Justice found, in part because of an adversarial
agency culture that encouraged an aggressive, enforcement-oriented
approach to policing.
285
Ferguson is not the only city that has experienced a long-term
estrangement between the police and members of the community.
Nor is it likely the only place where that estrangement is largely
attributable to the Warrior concept. An adversarial approach to
civilian encounters signals distrust far more readily that it does any
interest in developing meaningful, long-term partnerships with
community members,286 and that can have widespread and lasting
consequences. For example, the aggressive use of stop-and-frisk
tactics was identified as a "major source of friction" in police-
community relations in the 1960s.
287 New York Mayor Bill de Blasio
and Police Commissioner William Bratton made the same
observation in a January 2014 speech announcing a settlement
related to stop-and-frisk litigation.
288 In the long run, the use of
282. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN 
BY




283. Id. at 8. Since August 2014, the "hands up, don't shoot" chant has
remained an enduring part of protests related to policing. Whether History or
Hype, 'Hands Up, Don't Shoot' Endures, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 8, 2015, 9:44
AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/08/08/
4 3 04 11141/whether-history-or-hype-hands
-up-dont-shoot-endures.
284. A Department of Justice investigation later cleared Officer Wilson,
concluding that the physical evidence was consistent with the official story: that
Michael Brown had assaulted Officer Wilson and was moving toward him at the
time of the shooting. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 282, at 86.
285. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 260, at 2, 5. The report makes clear
that the motivation was to generate revenue through fines and penalties, not
ensure public safety. Id. at 11.
286. Stoughton, supra note 112, at 228-29.
287. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENF'T AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967).
288. When New York Mayor Bill de Blasio and Police Commissioner William
Bratton announced the settlement in the stop-and-frisk litigation, both
discussed the need to reform what de Blasio referred to as "a broken and
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adversarial or aggressive police tactics can engender deep and
potentially dangerous resentment among the public. Five of the ten
most violent and destructive riots in United States history grew out
of perceived police abuses.289 Those riots, and less destructive civic
unrest, such as the protests and looting in Ferguson, endanger
officers and civilians alike.
2. Rationalizing Misconduct and Illegal Behavior
The adversarial approach to policing that results largely from
law enforcement's veneration of the Warrior metaphor does not just
strain officer-civilian interactions; it also makes it more socially
acceptable, among officers, to engage in or tolerate unprofessional
conduct, misfeasance, malfeasance, and violations of law. Under a
Warrior worldview, the police mission is privileged over, rather than
being understood as existing within or being shaped by, the legal
principles that constrain police action. As the Wickersham
Commission reported, one of the factors that contributed to the
failure of Prohibition enforcement was "the attempt to enforce
[Prohibition] as something on another plane from the law generally;
an assumption that it was of paramount importance and that
constitutional guarantees and legal limitations on agencies of law
enforcement... must yield to the exigencies or convenience of
enforc[ement]."290 Officers perceive the criminal justice system-
with its multiple layers of protection for defendants and
complicated, legalistic restrictions on police behavior-as a failure,"a broken-down machine, spinning its wheels over solipsistic
argument rather than turning out clear-cut decisions based on the
elemental concepts of right and wrong."291
The Warrior brotherhood has its own code; it finds little merit
in externally imposed regulations. Legal and administrative
constraints thought up by lawyers or liability-sensitive
administrators are viewed as unnecessary and unwise obstacles to
effective law enforcement. For example, the Fourth Amendment's
misused stop-and-frisk policy." Transcript: Mayor Bill de Blasio Announces
Agreement in Landmark Stop-and-Frisk Case, NYC: OFF. MAYOR (Jan. 30,
2014), http://wwwl.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/727.14/transcript-mayor
-bill-de-blasio-agreement-landmark-stop-and.frisk-case/.
289. Some examples include a 2001 Cincinnati riot, the 1992 Rodney King
riots, the 1967 riots in Detroit and Newark, and the 1965 Watts riot in Los
Angeles. Daniel Bukszpan, America's Most Destructive Riots of All Time,
CNBC (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.cnbc.com/id/41372364. That does not include
the 1973 riot in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, which was at least partially
attributable to abuses within the corrections system, or the 1999 Seattle World
Trade Organization riot, which was, by many accounts, exacerbated by police
tactics. Id.
290. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENF'T, REPORT ON THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 81-82 (1931).
291. BAKER, supra note 140, at 246.
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limitations on searches and seizures are viewed as artificial, serving
only to protect the guilty at the expense of the crime-fighting
mission. One article explains the Warrior mindset in part by
stating:
Justice is an easy concept for cops to embrace. It's at the core
of our profession. But how many times can you watch a
criminal you arrested go free because of something out of your
control before you start to give up on "justice?" In truth, the
courts have very little to do with what a warrior knows as
justice.... If a just person looks for approval, it is only from
the people he or she respects .... Justice is what lets a warrior
see what needs to be done when laws and policies don't provide
easy answers.
292
In this mindset, laws that frustrate justice betray officers'
professional commitment to distinguishing right from wrong. That
betrayal calls into question the legitimacy of those rules.
Paralleling the effects of legitimacy in officer-civilian encounters,
officers' perception of the legal rules that regulate the police as
unjust undermines "the moral right of the law to dictate appropriate
behavior."293 As a result, violations of governing law and agency
policy become a morally appropriate, and sometimes necessary,
component of policing.
This negative view of governing law and agency policy as overly
restrictive is troublingly persistent. In a letter to the editor
published in the February 2016 issue of American Police Beat, a ten-
year veteran police officer and police instructor writes, "Legislation
is being passed that ties the hands of law enforcement, making it
more difficult to do our job .... The government needs to step in and
pass legislation that allows police to do their job properly."
294 A
substantial percentage of officers agree. In a 2000 study, about nine
hundred officers were asked to respond to the following statement:
"Always following the rules is not compatible with getting the job
done"; more than 40% of officers agreed or strongly agreed.
295 One
officer, interviewed in the 1980s, offered a more visceral reflection
on legal constraints: "If we're going to catch [criminals], fuck the
Constitution, fuck the Bill of Rights, fuck them, fuck you, fuck
everybody."2
96
292. Slade, supra note 20.
293. Mike Hough et al., Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional
Legitimacy, 4 POLICING 203, 205 (2010).
294. Delaney, supra note 149, at 24. As is often the case, there is neither
any specific identification of laws that the author views as making his job more
difficult nor a clear identification of what job is being made more difficult.
295. DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, POLICE ATTITUDES
TOWARD ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY 2 (2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/181
312.pdf.
296. BAKER, supra note 140, at 247-48.
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It is not just "the law" generally that is viewed as inhibiting
effective policing; officers can and do identify specific laws that they
disagree with, and that disagreement sometimes leads them to act
contrary to those laws. The list of potential examples is too long for
any single article, but two are particularly illuminative: the use of
force and perjury. In the previously mentioned 2000 study, more
than 30% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that "police are
not permitted to use as much force as is often necessary in making
arrests."297  Almost 25% agreed or strongly agreed that "it is
sometimes acceptable to use more force than is legally allowable to
control someone who physically assaults an officer."298 Troublingly,
a substantial number of respondents indicated that officers did not
just use more force than legally allowed, but also more force than
necessary. Over 21% reported that other officers use more force
than necessary sometimes, often, or always.299 Although only 4.1%
of respondents "thought that police officers regularly used more
physical force than necessary when making arrests," just 16% of
roopondonts reported that officero at their agency "never" use more
physical force than necessary.300
It is not just in the use-of-force context that adversarial
principles push officers to go beyond the boundaries of law or policy.
When, for example, an officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment
leads to the suppression of evidence, it is viewed as a failure of the
legal system itself rather than a consequence of the officer's
behavior.301 Officers sometimes take steps to remedy the perceived
failures of the legal system. The Mollen Commission, which
investigated "the nature and extent of corruption in the [New York
Police] Department," identified a pervasive problem with police
perjury, writing, "[T]he practice of police falsification.., is so
common in certain precincts that it has spawned its own word:
'testilying."302 This widespread practice resulted from "a persistent
297. See WEISBURD ETAL., supra note 295, at 2.
298. See id. This is not to suggest that officers do not also use less force than
would be legally permissible. In one study of nearly three hundred officers,
officers self-reported not using deadly force in the vast majority of cases when it
would have been legally justified. See Anthony J. Pinizzotto et al., Restraint in
the Use of Deadly Force, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (June 2012),
https://leb.fbi.gov/2012/june/restraint-in-the-use-of-deadly.force-a-preliminary
-study. The distinction may be explained by the different foci in the three
questions: the use of force to make an arrest is distinct from the use of force to
control comoone who has physically asoaulted an officcr, and both arc distinct
from the use of deadly force. The law may be viewed as overly restrictive in the
former two contexts even while officers' experience suggcsts that it may bc more
permissive in the latter context.
299. WEISBURD ETAL., supra note 295, at 3.
300. Id. (emphasis added).
301. See Stoughton, supra note 150, at 882 n.222.
302. THE CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T,
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belief among many officers that it [was] necessary and justified,
even if unlawful."30 3 Officers perjure themselves largely because
they view the result the perjury achieves-convicting criminals-as
justifying the dishonest means by which that result is achieved;
testilying is seen as necessary to overcome the legal obstacles of the
courtroom.304 In other words, officers lie to counteract the effect of
legal rules, such as the exclusionary rule, that they see as technical
barriers that protect criminals from conviction despite ample
evidence of guilt.
305
As these examples demonstrate, a culture that privileges the
police mission over the rules that exist to circumscribe the scope of
that mission offers a way to rationalize and justify violations of
those rules. The Warrior metaphor also creates an environment
where other officers' violations of the rules are tolerated or implicitly
approved of:
[Blad apples are not always thrown out when they are
discovered. Individual cops are all too willing to look the other
way when another cop does something wrong. It's easier and
safer to tend to your own business and to ignore someone else's
petty abuses, laziness or corruption. Police department
administrations often tacitly condone less than professional
behavior rather than stir up bad publicity or incur employee
animosity by actively prosecuting cases of misconduct.
30 6
Some of that reluctance, of course, stems from the high
probability of costs and uncertain probability of benefits that result
from instigating disciplinary action.
30 7 But a Warrior worldview
may also make it easy for officers and supervisors to discount the
mistreatment of criminal suspects or other civilians; by accusing an
officer of misconduct, a civilian may identify themselves as an
"asshole" to whom officers are disinclined to be sympathetic. This
may explain why more than 80% of surveyed officers indicated a
COMMISSION REPORT: ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS 1, 36 (1994)
[hereinafter MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT].
303. Id. at 41.
304. See id.; Morgan Cloud, Judges, Testilying, and the Constitution, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1350-55 (1996); Andrew McClurg, supra note 139, at 411-15
(1999); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About
It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1044-48 (1996); see also Jennifer Darrow, Police
Perjury: Examining the Relationship Between Social Tendency and Managerial
Considerations (2015) (unpublished D.M. dissertation, Colorado Technical
University) (examining how managerial considerations influence officer
perjury).
305. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Replaying the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth
Amendment Violations as Direct Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241,
244-45 (2010).
306. BAKER, supra note 140, at 208.
307. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761,
797 (2012).
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"code of silence" was not an important part of the trust and bond
between officers, and yet
about one-quarter (24.9[%]) of the sample agreed or strongly
agreed that whistle blowing is not worth it, more than two-
thirds (67.4[%]) reported that police officers who report
incidents of misconduct are likely to be given a "cold shoulder"
by fellow officers, and a majority (52.4[%]) agreed or strongly
agreed that it is not unusual for police officers to "turn a blind
eye" to other officers' improper conduct.30
Further, "[a] surprising 6 in 10 (61[%]) indicated that police
officers do not always report even serious criminal violations that
involve the abuse of authority by fellow officers."309
3. Resisting Criticism and Rejecting Reform
The same worldview that permits officers to rationalize rule
breaking by delegitimizing or discrediting those rules also provides
justifications for resisting criticism, particularly external criticism,
and for rejecting proposals for reform. Officers who have been
trained to be wary of civilians during individual encounters can be
similarly distrustful of the public at large, particularly when public
opinion is critical of policing. The resistance to criticism grows from
a culture that individualizes misconduct, celebrates officers'
specialized knowledge, insulates officers from second-guessing, and
associates criticism with frustration of the police mission.
As policing has come under increased public scrutiny over the
past several years, many voices within policing have sought to
defend the profession as a whole from being tarnished by individual
acts of misconduct. When an officer engages in misconduct by, for
example, using excessive force or racial slurs, the incident is taken
to reflect that particular officer's shortcomings, especially the
officer's failure to live up to the Warrior code.3 10 In other words,
many police agencies, officers, and apologists seek to individualize
problems by blaming a few "rogue officers" or "bad apples" without
acknowledging systemic causes. This view shifts the responsibility
for misconduct away from police culture and toward the distinct
failures of the officers involved. Under this view there is no need for
systemic reform, except perhaps to the extent that the law
enforcement industry should seek to better identify and exclude bad
actors. Thus, discussions about systemic reform are viewed as a
waste of time at best and a dangerous distraction from the real
issues-such as the lack of public respect and compliance-at worst.
308. WEISBURD ETAL., supra note 295, at 3, 5.
309. Id.
310. See Valerie Van Brocklin, Where Have All the Warriors Gone?,




Additionally, officers view criticism as illegitimate and invalid
because they have come to believe that only police can make
determinations about good policing. Girded in the vestments of the
professional crime fighter, officers may think that "they and they
alone are the most capable of sensing right from wrong; determining
who is and who is not respectable; and, most critically, deciding
what is to be done about it (if anything)."311 Members of the public
do not understand the realities of policing or, if they do, they simply
refuse to acknowledge them. One policing text-intended to teach
officers the skills they need to prepare for and survive a deadly force
encounter-describes policing thus: "Police officers are on the front
line of a war that goes undeclared because of politics and political
correctness."312 Those who criticize the police are believed to be
either ignorant of or willfully ignoring the dangerous environment
that officers work in.
Worse, the critics have not "been there"; they have not walked
the beat or dealt with the same situations that officers have.
313
Their lack of experience entirely discredits their critique of policing.
A letter to the editor of the Washington Post is representative: "It is
very easy for someone who has never walked in a police officer's
shoes to second-guess the decisions that those officers made."
314
This mindset is not restricted to street-level interactions; it persists
in situations that are entirely capable of being empirically tested
with a range of reliable methodologies. David Harris described the
skepticism with which officers greet evidence-based reforms that
originate outside of law enforcement circles, such as replacing
simultaneous photo line-ups with sequential photo line-ups that are
less likely to result in erroneous identifications, writing that "police
believe that they have special, experience-based and intuitive
knowledge that those outside their occupational circle neither share
nor understand."315  Police exceptionalism perpetuates the belief
that outsiders of all stripes are simply not competent to provide
useful feedback.
311. Van Maanen, supra note 248, at 346, 347.
312. ARTWOHL & CHRISTENSEN, supra note 155, at 6. There is a great deal of
unintended irony in the description of the "undeclared" war given the many
explicit comparisons between policing and war and between officers and
soldiers on the frontline. Nevertheless, the belief that officers are fighting a
series of semisecret battles that the public remains ignorant of remains a
commonly held view in policing.
313. Hidden underneath this argument is the belief that the members of the
public who criticize the police would not be capable of doing the job themselves.
See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
314. Spencer Pines, Letter to the Editor, Second-guessing Our Police
Officers, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/second-guessing-our-police-officers/2015/12/24/56beb4a4-a9al-1le5
-b596-113f59ee069astory.html.
315. HARRIS, supra note 136, at 67.
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To those within the Warrior circle, only fellow Warriors have
the right to censure each other;316 but in reality even other officers-
or former officers-are discouraged from doing so. This principle is
particularly prevalent in the context of judging another officer's
actions during a use-of-force scenario. As an article on Police
Firearms Officers Association states, 'You weren't in their shoes
during the incident .... You didn't see it evolve from their
perspective. You may think you would have acted differently, but no
one knows for sure how they'll act in a life-threatening encounter
until they're actually in one."317 That advice was provided to help
officers avoid inflicting a "secondary assault" on a colleague involved
in a shooting or other critical incident,318 which is certainly an
important consideration. But the underlying argument has been
broadened into the following axiom: an officer's use-of-force
decisions should not be subject to criticism by people who were not
there at the time, regardless of their own experience or expertise.319
Attempts to do so are derisively referred to as 'Monday-morning
quarterbacking."320 As one officer bluntly puts it in his memoir:
Even to this day police officers sometimes have to make split
second decisions and most of the time you won't know if it's the
right one or the wrong one until the problem is over and that's
when the Monday morning quarterbacks came in.... [J]f you
316. Many officers believe that law enforcement is properly self-regulating.
Statements to the effect of "I'm the first one to criticize bad policing" are
common predicates for an explanation of why a particular incident was not
problematic. As one police union wrote in its newsletter, "Nobody hates bad
cops more than other cops, and the [Fraternal Order of Police] doesn't have any
sympathy for a cop who crosses the line." Statement From President
Caterbury, Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police (Apr. 30, 2015),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/OB6ywJyXluiH6XO9sd21XMO lfOTg/view.
317. Charles Remsberg, 8 Ways to Help Another Cop After a Shooting,
POLICE FIREARMs OFFICERS ASS'N, https://www.pfoa.co.uk/292/8-ways-to-help-a
-cop-after-a-shooting (last visited July 15, 2016).
318. See id.
319. See id. All other things being equal, the inability to condemn an
officer's actions because one was not there at the time might be assumed to
carry with it the inability to condone the officer's actions for the same reason.
Taken logically, this would suggest that officers would reserve judgment about
other officers' uses of force, neither condemning nor condoning them. That, of
course, is not typically the case.
320. See Peter Callaghan, Avoiding 'Lawful But Awful" How Minneapolis
and St. Paul Police Officials Are Looking to Change When Officers Use Deadly
Force, MINNPOST (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-
policy/2016/03/avoiding-lawful-awful-how-minneapolis-and-st-paul-police-
officials-are-looki; Kevin Davis, Officer Survival in 20/20 Hindsight,




weren't there at the time, then you're probably talking out of
your ass.
321
Even officers who were there and were intimately involved in the
events at issue may fall back on insisting that they would not have
done anything differently, even in retrospect.
322
Not only is second-guessing believed to be inappropriate, it is
also viewed as an obstacle to effective policing. Questioning and
criticism, in this worldview, are proximate to treason; calling an
officer's capabilities or honor into doubt shakes that officer's resolve
by making an already-difficult duty even less attractive. This
allegedly endangers officers and weakens the Thin Blue Line
between order and chaos. Most recently, this argument has been
made in public discourse about what has come to be known as the
"Ferguson Effect."323 Patrick Lynch, the head of the largest police
union in New York City, blamed an increase in shootings in the city
on "multiple levels of intense oversight and constant second-
guessing of officers enforcing the law that is counterproductive."
3 24
In late 2015, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James B.
Comey suggested "that the additional scrutiny and criticism of
police officers in the wake of highly publicized episodes of police
brutality may have led to an increase in violent crime in some cities
as officers have become less aggressive" about policing.32
5 When
321. ANTHONY J. CARBO, MEMOIRS OF A NEWARK, NEW JERSEY POLICE OFFICER
119 (2004).
322. See Ferguson Cop Darren Wilson Says He Would Not Do It Differently,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 25, 2014, 7:26 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline
/michael-brown-shooting/ferguson-cop-darren-wilson-says-he-would-not-do-it
-n256026.
323. There are at least three different definitions of the "Ferguson Effect."
First, it can refer to the increased public scrutiny of policing. Second, it can
refer to the effect of that scrutiny on officers. Third, it can refer to the effect of
how officers respond to that scrutiny, particularly the effect on crime rates. For
an empirical analysis of the third definition of the "Ferguson Effect," see David
C. Pyrooz et al., Was There a Ferguson Effect on Crime Rates in Large U.S.
Cities?, 46 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 1 (2016); Scott E. Wolfe & Justin Nix, The Alleged
"Ferguson Effect" and Police Willingness to Engage in Community Partnership,
40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 1 (2015). For a criticism of that work, see Heather Mac
Donald, Stat Crimes Matter, CITY J. (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.city
-journal.org/2016/eon0222hm.html. For a response to that criticism, see Scott
E. Wolfe et al., What Does Science Tell Us About the So-Called Ferguson Effect?,
QUILLErTE (Mar. 1, 2016), http://quillette.com/2016/03/01/ferguson-effect-crime
-spike-reporting-ideology-science/.
324. Tina Moore et al., PBA Head Pat Lynch Says City Needs More Cops and
Less 'Constant Second-Guessing' to Combat Rise in Murders, Shootings, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (June 3, 2015, 12:25 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/pba-head-pat-lynch-cops-needed-halt-rise-murders-article- 1.2244588.
325. Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Chief Links Scrutiny of
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officers are less aggressive, or so the story goes, crime increases.
That story is particularly puissant when it is applied to crimes
against officers themselves. After two NYPD officers were
murdered in 2014, a police union official argued that New York City
Mayor Bill de Blasio had "blood on [his) hands" because of an earlier
comment de Blasio had made acknowledging community members'
concerns about policing.
326
The culture of modern law enforcement too often flatly refuses
to acknowledge systemic factors that contribute to misconduct and
castigates any form of criticism as misplaced, uninformed, and
affirmatively dangerous to officers and communities. The result is a
profession that remains resistant to internal and external criticism
and resents calls for change.
III. CREATING A GUARDIAN CULTURE
If the principles and value systems of policing have contributed
to the profession's current problems, systemic reform requires
changing those principles. If the Warrior is a problem, as I believe it
is, then the Guardian may be a suitable replacement. Guardian
policing has enjoyed a surge in popularity among some police
leaders, and Guardian rhetoric has appeared in the report issued by
President Obama's Task Force on 21st Century Policing,327 popular
media stories,328 and articles intended for a law enforcement
audience.329 But prior work, including my own, has tended to treat
Guardian policing as an abstract concept incapable of precise
definition.33 0 In this Part, I seek to offer a more robust definition of
Guardian policing before charting a course for future work in this
area.
A. Guardian Policing
Like the Warrior concept, the Guardian metaphor shapes
officers' perceptions of the police mission and their relationship with
the communities they serve in a way that ultimately affects their
326. See Douglas Ernst, De Blasio Has 'Blood on the Hands' After NYPD
Shooting, Says Union President, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2014),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/21/de-blasio-has-blood-hands
-after-nypd-shooting-says/.
327. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 9,
at 1, 11-12 (2015).
328. See Ashley Blacerzak & Julie Tate, Creating Guardians, Calming
Warriors, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf
/investigative/2015/12/10/new.style-of-police-training-aims-to-produce-
guardians-not-warriors/; Mather, supra note 19; Morgan, supra note 19; Roufa,
supra note 19; Schwartz, supra note 19.
329. Not all articles view the change in rhetoric positively. See Glennon,
supra note 20; Slade, supra note 20; Smith, supra note 20; Van Brocklin, supra
note 20.
330. See Stoughton, supra note 112, at 231.
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behavior. But where Warrior policing has contributed to avoidable
conflicts and undermined police-community relations, Guardian
policing seeks to instill officers with values that encourage public
engagement, foster trust, and build lasting community partnerships.
The result is safer and more effective law enforcement.
Guardian principles will lead to safer policing for three primary
reasons. First, individuals in communities that trust the police are
more likely to cooperate and less likely to resist officers, diminishing
the risk to officers and the need for force.33 1 Second, Guardian
policing seeks to avoid confrontations when it is possible to do so,
which similarly minimizes the risk to officers and civilians alike.
332
Third, Guardian policing increases the police agency social capital
with the community, reducing suspicion of police actions and
mitigating the negative effects of high-profile incidents, such as an
egregious use of excessive force.333 Imagine, for example, what the
public response to the shooting death of Michael Brown would have
been if the Ferguson Police Department had built a long-standing,
positive relationship with the community. No one would have been
happy, and hard questions would have been asked (and properly so),
but the absence of protests would have improved the safety of
hundreds of officers and civilians alike. Guardian policing is also a
more effective approach to law enforcement; officers rely on civilians
to report crimes, assist with investigations, and provide information
during prosecution. "People tell good cops what is going on in their
neighborhoods and work with them to keep it safe."334 Further,
officers' efforts to build and maintain positive relationships with the
community can reduce the incidence of crime.335 This is so because
"police illegitimacy can itself be criminogenic; there are indications
that negative perceptions of the police increase violent crime in
disadvantaged areas."
336
Guardian policing accepts as its first principle the responsibility
to protect civilians from unnecessary indignity and harm. Officers
331. See Mike Masterson, Perspective: Improving Officer Safety and Citizen
Support: Solving the Puzzle, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (May 6, 2014),
https://leb.fbi.gov/2014/may/perspective-improving-officer-safety-and-citizen
-support-solving-the-puzzle.
332. See Stoughton, supra note 112, at 231-33.
333. See generally Lane Crowthers, Building Social Capital on the Street:
Leadership in Communities, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
COMMUNITY AND "BOWLING ALONE" 218 (Scott L. Mclean et al. eds., 2002)
(discussing community-oriented policing as a way to build social capital and
empower citizens in the community).
334. Rahr & Rice, supra note 14, at 3.
335. See Kane, supra note 105, at 492; see also What Is Community
Policing?, CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POL'Y, http://cebcp.org/evidence
-based-policing/what-works-in-policing/research-evidence-review/community-
policing/ (last visited July 18, 2016) (listing studies on crime rates and
community policing).
336. Stoughton, supra note 16, at 2189.
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implement that principle by emphasizing their public service
mission, of which crime fighting-crime prevention, identification,
investigation, and criminal apprehension-is a relatively small, if
important, component. A Guardian agency embraces the democratic
ideal that the legitimacy of any government agency-and the moral
right to impose the coercive power of the state-depends on the
consent of the governed. In this way, Guardian policing adopts the
Peelian Principle "that the police are the public and that the public
are the police."337  To that end, a Guardian culture inculcates
officers with the belief that good policing demands more than merely
lawful policing; it requires what Tracey Meares calls "rightful
policing."338  Guardian policing emphasizes cooperation over
compliance, communication over commands, and legitimacy over
authority.
It is important to recognize that the Guardian concept is not a
lesser aspect of the police Warrior. In fact, the opposite is true.
Guardian policing retains the four core principles of the Warrior-
honor, duty, resolve, and a willingness to engage in righteous
violence-but those requirements are joined by five additional,
essential attributes: respect for human dignity, empathy, patience,
inclusivity, and introspection.
1. Respect for Human Dignity
To protect members of the public from unnecessary indignity,
Guardians must be attuned to human dignity. Guardian officers
must honor the sanctity of human life while at the same time
appreciating the importance of others' perceptions of self-worth,
physical and psychological integrity, and sense of empowerment.
Moreover, officers must possess an acute awareness of how their
own actions may affect those perceptions. The Guardian is aware
that some police actions-especially the coercive use of authority to
stop, frisk, search, arrest, or interrogate-inevitably impose some
level of indignity. For that reason, Guardians must conduct
themselves with an eye toward minimizing, to the extent possible
given the situation, the potential for humiliation and harm. This
principle is most valuable when officers have little reason to respect
the person they are interacting with. Officers will be required to
interact with admitted child rapists, protestors and demonstrators
who espouse repugnant beliefs,339 and belligerent civilians who
337. Home Office, supra note 28.
338. See Meares & Neyroud, supra note 13, at 3.
339. Consider what may be the single best example in modern times, and
one that occurred only a few blocks away from my office in Columbia, South
Carolina. After the state legislature ordered the removal of the Confederate
Flag that had flown on the State House grounds for over fifty years, members of
the National Socialist Movement, a neo-Nazi party that espouses White
Supremacist beliefs, arrived to protest the removal. See Nicole Hensley, KKK
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make unfounded complaints about police misconduct. Although
officers need not agree with or approve of these individuals or their
actions, respect for human dignity must guide the officers as they
interview or arrest rapists, work with protestors to set up the route
of a march, or take a complaint from belligerent civilians. To the
extent that indignity is unavoidable, officers should seek to
minimize that harm ex ante and to take steps ex post to reduce the
sting. For the Guardian, dignitary harms are regrettable side
effects of officer actions; humiliation, indignity, and embarrassment
should never be an officer's objective, nor should they be used as
tools to "maintain the power image of the beat officer" or for any
other reason.340
2. Empathy
As a counterpart to respect for human dignity, Guardians must
have both the ability and, perhaps more relevantly, the willingness
to take other people's perceptions of a given situation seriously.
Empathy refers to the capacity to understand and appreciate
another person's sentiments;341 officers who are unable or unwilling
to do so risk exposing civilians they interact with to unnecessary
indignity or harm. Consider the differences between what
individuals inside and outside of the police force consider a normal
encounter.342 When a veteran officer conducts a traffic stop, makes
a misdemeanor arrest, or responds to a report of a burglary, the
officer's expectations and actions are guided by a long line of similar
experiences. Traffic stops, low-level arrests, and burglaries are, to
put it bluntly, business as usual. But to the motorist, arrestee, or
burglary victim, the situation may be far outside the range of
Neo-Nazis Are Met by Protestors at S.C. Capitol, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 19,
2015, 10:27 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/kkk-neo-nazis
-met-protesters-s-captiol-article-1.229662 4 . When an older white protestor
wearing a shirt adorned with a swastika began suffering from the heat, Leroy
Smith, the black director of the South Carolina Department of Public Safety,
helped him up the state house steps so he could recover. A photograph of
Director Smith helping the unnamed protestor up the steps quickly went viral
and demonstrates the remarkable professionalism that officers are expected to
demonstrate as a matter of routine. See Dan Barry, Black South Carolina
Trooper Explains Why He Helped a White Supremacist, N.Y. TIMES (July 25,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/us/black-south-carolina-trooper-
explains-why-he-embraced-a-white-supremacist.html.
340. See TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 271, at 47-48.
341. See What Is Empathy?, GREATER GOOD SCI. CTR.,
http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/topic/empathy/definition (last visited Aug. 12,
2016).
342. See Johnathan Wender, The Phenomenology of Arrest: A Case Study in
the Poetics of Police-Citizen Encounters, in THE POETICS OF CRIME:
UNDERSTANDING & RESEARCHING CRIME & DEVIANCE THROUGH CREATIVE
SOURCES 29, 40-44 (M. Jacobsen, ed., 2014) (offering examples of officers using
empathy to facilitate peaceful surrender from criminal suspects).
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normal experiences. What is a routine aspect of an officer's working
life may be nerve-racking for a civilian who feels confused, angry,
and powerless.
Further, different civilians may have different perceptions of
and responses to officers. A young black male may perceive an
officer as officious and harassing, while an older white woman might
not. It is incumbent on officers to be aware of those different
perceptions and to calibrate their actions, expectations, and
reactions accordingly.343  Treating people equally-which many
officers are quick to emphasize as one of their guiding principles-
fails to account for the fact that people are different, that civilians
come to the encounter with different histories, attitudes, and
expectations. Treating people empathetically, on the other hand,
prompts officers to take those individual characteristics into account
when they interact with people. An officer who cannot perceive or
take seriously a civilian's perspective will not be effective at
reducing tension, building trust, or protecting civilians from
unnecessary indignity or harm.
3. Patience
Engaging civilians with empathy and respect for human dignity
requires officers to take time and make an effort to do so whenever
plausible. Officers must be cognizant that the best outcome is not
necessarily the fastest or most efficient but is instead the one that
best protects civilians from unnecessary indignity and harm. With
that in mind, officers must have the patience to put that core value
above other interests, including expediency and other, more
personal considerations. For example, when confronted with a
belligerent suspect who is offering verbal or physical, but
nonviolent, resistance to an impending arrest, an officer's first
inclination should be to attempt to de-escalate the situation and talk
the person into handcuffs, notwithstanding that it may be far more
efficient and, on some occasions, more personally satisfying to
wrestle the individual into handcuffs. Just because the conditions
for lawfully using force are met does not mean that force is
necessary. Patience has costs, primarily time. A Guardian officer
recognizes and accepts that such an approach may stretch what
could have been a ten-minute encounter into an hour-long, wide-
343. I am not suggesting that the officer has to agree with the young black
male that a particular interaction constitutes harassment. Indeed, I would be
surprised if that were the case. But an officer whose guiding principles
emphasize empathy and respect for human dignity should appreciate the
civilian's perspective, understand that it is honestly felt (regardless of the
officer's belief about its accuracy), and respond by modifying his or her actions,
expectations, and reactions to maximize the potential for a positive encounter.
Receiving, respecting, and responding are the core actions of a Guardian officer.
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ranging conversation. But for the Guardian this time is well spent
because it attempts to avoid unnecessary harm.
344
4. Inclusivity
As individuals and societies, humans have a troubled history
with differences. We fear that which we perceive as different.
Officers are not immune from that unfortunate aspect of the human
condition. In fact, officers not only have their own biases, they are
also called on to investigate or respond to reports and incidents that
grow out of other people's biases.
345 Those differences, and the
weight we put on them, can dramatically affect officer actions.
Policing can look very different in high-income, low-crime
neighborhoods with primarily white residents who enjoy a high
degree of social and political capital than it does in low-income,
high-crime areas with primarily minority residents who have
relatively little social and political capital.
346 To some extent, this is
pervasive in society.347 Nevertheless, Guardian policing attempts to
mitigate such divisions by instilling in officers the belief that all
members of the public, without exception or exclusion, deserve to be
treated with respect, empathy, and patience. Inclusivity may be
particularly important over time, as changing circumstances and
perspectives shift the identification of "the Other" from group to
group. Just in the past few decades, concerns about black urban
344. In many cases, such an approach may prove to be effective, but it is
important to observe that patience remains an important attribute even if the
end result in a particular incident requires the use of force.
345. For a dramatic example, consider the recent case of Ahmed al-Menhali,
an Emerati citizen, who a hotel clerk reported to family members as wearing a
"full head dress" and "pledging his allegiance or something to ISIS" while in the
lobby of a hotel in Avon, Ohio. Two family members contacted the police, who
responded to what they took as a potential terrorist threat. Yonette Joseph,
Emirates Warn Against Traditional Clothing Abroad after Man Is Mistaken for
Terrorist in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com
/2016/07/04/world/middleeast/emirates-issues-travel-warning-after'man-in'robe
-is-mistaken-for-isis-terrorist-in-ohio.html.
346. Attorney and sociologist Christopher Cooper, a former law enforcement
officer himself, has observed that officers use their authority differently when
mediating disputes with different civilians; the race and class of the individuals
involved can affect whether officers assert their authority to resolve a dispute
for civilians or seek to mediate as civilians resolve a dispute for themselves. See
Cooper, supra note 101, at 125-26.
347. Psychologically, we are unconsciously inclined to blame people's bad
behavior on personal characteristics that distinguish "them" from "us," such as
religion or skin color; psychologists call this "the ultimate attribution error." See
Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A
Cultural Psychological Critique of Tort Law's Actual Cause and Foreseeability
Inquiries, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 195, 218-19 (2004).
2016]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
youth as super-predators in the mid-1990s348 have been supplanted
by concerns about Muslims as potential terrorists entering the
country by pretending to be Syrian refugees349 or the risk of male
predators pretending to be transgendered to gain access to women's
restrooms.350 A police force that embraces inclusivity will be less
distracted by changing public perceptions and better able to focus on
its mission.
5. Introspection
Professionalism is difficult. Professionals must not only stay
abreast of recent developments in their field but also engage in
regular self-assessment to ensure that they are effectively
advancing the goals of their profession. For officers, introspection
means thinking both about whether they successfully protected
civilians from unnecessary indignity and harm in prior encounters
and about how they may be able to do so more effectively in the
future. Training-ranging from tactical and use-of-force training to
cultural awareness training-is part of introspection, but so is
rethinking encounters. Officers should solicit feedback and
constructive criticism from peers and supervisors and should think
seriously about the way that their actions and attitudes affected the
result of any given interaction. Even when an officer uses force,
including lethal force, in a perfectly legal manner, both the officer
and his or her agency should think critically about whether a
different approach or tactic could have changed or improved the
outcome. The point is not to punish the officer for any missteps-
indeed, it will often not have been clear at the time that certain
steps were missteps. The goal of introspection is to think about
potential alternatives so as to improve officer and community safety
by reducing risks in the future.
B. The Path Forward
In future work, I intend to develop a series of concrete proposals
that can help encourage law enforcement to adopt and advocate
348. John J. DiLiulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WEEKLY
STANDARD (Nov. 27, 1995), http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-coming-of-the
-super-predators/article/8160.
349. See Mussarat Khan & Kathryn Ecklund, Attitudes Toward Muslim
Americans Post-9/11, 7 J. MUSLIM HEALTH 1, 11, (2012),
http://quod.lb.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/attitudes-toward-muslim-americans
-post-911.pdf?c=jmmh;idno=10381607.0007.101; Russel Berman, A New Threat
to the Syrian Refugee Program, ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/the-arrest-of-iraqi-refugees
-on-terrorism-charges/423339/.
350. See, e.g., Patrik Jonsson, Welcome to the Home of the Toughest





Guardian principles. For now, it is sufficient to observe that such a
cultural shift will require changes that are both extrinsic and
intrinsic to law enforcement agencies. Extrinsically, for example,
communities will need to change the way that they evaluate
successful policing. As attorney and former Baltimore Police
Department officer Adam Braskich has written, using crime rates to
assess a police agency or police executives creates perverse
incentives that encourage the agency to adopt an aggressive
approach that undermines police-community relations.
351 Similarly,
evaluating the success of a law enforcement agency by reviewing
average response times to nonemergency calls can encourage
dispatchers and officers to minimize the amount of time it takes to
handle calls rather than maximize the potential for positive officer-
civilian interactions. Intrinsically, police agencies will need to
modify pre-service and in-service training and how supervisors
evaluate officer performance. Just as relying on crime rates can
create perverse incentives, so too can evaluating officers based on
the number of enforcement-related actions they take, such as stops,
arrests, or tickets.
Legal reform will also be necessary to prompt the adoption of
Guardian policing's principles.
35 2 This is true of legal rules that
regulate officer behavior as well as legal rules that govern the
investigation of police officers and any resulting administrative
discipline or criminal prosecution. For example, scholars have long
criticized various Fourth Amendment rules on 
doctrinal,353
psychological,354 and equitable grounds,
3 55 but it is also true that
constitutional rules permit, and arguably encourage, officers to rely
on deception and informational asymmetry in situations where
doing so is fundamentally contrary to avoiding unnecessary
indignity and harm. Additionally, the special protections offered by
351. See Braskich, supra note 251.
352. See, e.g., Julian A. Cook III, Police Culture in the Twenty-First Century:
A Critique of the President's Task Force's Final Report, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
ONLINE 106, 114 (2016) (arguing that police culture cannot change without
reform to the laws governing the exclusionary rule).
353. See, e.g., Laurent Sacaroff, Trespass and Deception, 2015 BYU L. REV.
359, 359 (2015) (arguing that Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) and
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) should be read to limit the ability
of police to use deception to obtain consent, since that would not be valid
consent, and the entry would be a trespass).
354. See, e.g., Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the
Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 60 (2002) (arguing that when
psychological coercion is used, an unreasonable search and seizure has taken
place, violating the Fourth Amendment).
355. See, e.g., Peter A. Lyle, Racial Profiling and the Fourth Amendment:
Applying the Minority Victim Perspective to Ensure Equal Protection Under the
Law, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 243, 247 (2001) (arguing that sensitivity to
racial perceptions and biases could produce more equitable results under the
Fourth Amendment).
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the various states' versions of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of
Rights complicate, and in some instances prevent, agencies from
effectively investigating alleged misconduct.356 When officers are
found to have engaged in misconduct, statutory or contractual
provisions may prevent the agency from responding appropriately.
Even in egregious situations where an officer has been terminated-
or, more commonly, resigned in lieu of termination-there are few, if
any, legal mechanisms that prevent the officer from seeking
employment at a different agency.357
Identifying the full panoply of necessary and advisable changes
is one thing, but making them happen is something else entirely.
Building on the three-part analytical framework that Joanna
Schwartz devised to "evaluate the relative strengths and limitations
of those engaged in efforts to reform the police,"358 future work will
also seek to identify the actors and entities that are in the best
position to introduce and implement those changes. While many
may think of the Department of Justice in this context, our
hyperlocalized law enforcement system does not lend itself to
centralized mandates, save perhaps for the constitutional
minimums articulated by the Supreme Court. To be truly
insightful, future analysis must consider the potential for other
actors and mechanisms, such as municipal city councils' budgetary
authorities and private insurance agencies, to affect police agency
policy and practice.359
Finally, future work must also discuss how we can best measure
whether efforts to shift the culture of policing are proving successful,
ineffective, or counterproductive. The slow speed of cultural change
and the multiplicity of law enforcement agencies in this country may
frustrate some reform efforts, but they also offer the potential for
careful study; researchers can identify what works and why it works
at some law enforcement agencies so that similar measures can be
applied and tested at other agencies. There is tremendous diversity
within the law enforcement industry, and with that comes the need
356. See Eli Hager, Blue Shield, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 27, 2015, 12:06
PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/27/blue-shield#.RUaYYa2Ss.
357. Structural flaws in the legal and administrative regulations that
govern police have allowed problem officers to move from one agency to another,
becoming so-called "gypsy cops." See Gordon Dill, South Carolina Police
Shortage Means Employment for "Gypsy" Officers, WSPA.COM (Feb. 11, 2016,
11:00 PM), http://wspa.com/2016/02/1 l/south-carolina-police-shortage.mean
s-employment-for-gypsy-officers/; Roger L. Goldman, Rogue Cops Should Not Be
Recycled from One Department o the Next, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2015, 7:15 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/20/rogue-cops-should
-not-be-recycled-from-one-police-department.to-the-next.
358. Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, U. CHI. LEGAL F.
(forthcoming 2016).
359. See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulated Public Police, 130
HARv. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1).
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for a robust but flexible framework to evaluate success and identify
failure. Every prescriptive response to any problem has the
potential for unintended consequences, but the unintended
consequences of changing law enforcement may impact individual
officers and civilians far more personally than the side effects of
change in other contexts.
CONCLUSION
The idealization of the Warrior concept, ubiquitous in modern
law enforcement, was adopted with the best of intentions, but has
resulted in rhetoric, attitudes, and actions that fall far short of the
principles it purports to venerate. Instead, modern policing
principles have fostered many of the problems that officers now face
by encouraging unnecessary conflicts, allowing officers to rationalize
misconduct and unlawful behavior, and insulating them from
criticism. That, in turn, has contributed to an adversarial approach
to policing that has undermined police-community relations,
frustrated effective law enforcement, needlessly endangered officers
and civilians, and stymied meaningful reform.
If the veneration of the Warrior has created problems for
policing, the solution requires law enforcement to incorporate its
previously cherished principles into a new Guardian culture that
views as its highest priority the protection of civilians from
unnecessary indignity and harm. This shift is more complicated
than providing officers with new training or equipment; it requires
shifting the basic principles of the profession itself and changing
how officers view the police mission, perceive their relationship to
the public, and distinguish between bad, good, and great policing.
After all, it is an officer's underlying value system, learned from and
reinforced by peers and agency culture, that will inform the officer's
decisions and actions. To implement the Guardian paradigm,
agencies must focus on instilling in officers an awareness of and
commitment to respect for human dignity, empathy, patience,
inclusion, and introspection. In future work, I will offer a series of
concrete proposals that explore the changes that must be made to
encourage the continued evolution of policing and identify the actors
and entities that are in the best position to make those changes.
Cultural change in policing is nothing new-indeed, the history
of policing is marked by dramatic, if slow, changes in culture and
principles. In 1988, as law enforcement moved ponderously away
from the Professional Era toward the Community Policing Era,
criminologists George Kelling and Mark Moore noted, "If elements of
the emerging organizational strategy are identified and the policing
institution is guided through the change rather than left blindly
thrashing about, we expect that the public will be better served,
policymakers and police administrators more effective, and the
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profession of policing revitalized."360  Today, as the policing
profession struggles to live up to the promises of community
policing, Kelling and Moore's observation remains equally valid with
regard to the shift toward Guardian policing.
360. Kelling & Moore, supra note 42, at 14.
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